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ABSTRACT
Felmban, Wejdan S. The Role of Information and Reflection in Reducing the Bias Blind
Spot: A Cross-Cultural Study. Published Doctor of Philosophy dissertation,
University of Northern Colorado, 2015.
The current study examined whether two types of intervention reduced the "bias
blind spot" (i.e., perceptions of others being more biased than one’s self) and whether the
bias blind spot was related to culture, reasoning performance, and motivation. The
design was a 2 (information: reading or not reading about the bias blind spot) x 2
(reflection reflecting on the effects of biases on other or non-relevant reflection) x 2
(priming: reasoning tasks completed before or after the interventions). Students (N =
193) from Western and Middle Eastern cultures participated online or in a class. In each
condition, participants responded to several reasoning tasks and were later told the
correct answers to the reasoning tasks. In the bias blind spot information condition,
participants read about the bias blind spot and, specifically, were told most people believe
they are less likely to commit cognitive biases than other people. In the reflection
condition, participants were asked to write about possible consequences of the bias blind
spot. Priming referred to whether the interventions were given before or after
participants solved the reasoning problems. Analyses indicated that neither information
nor reflection significantly reduced the bias blind spot. However, priming reduced the
bias. When the reasoning tasks were presented before the interventions (priming
condition), the bias blind spot was lower than when the tasks were presented after the
iii

interventions. Also, although reasoning performance failed to predict variation in the
bias blind spot, motivation to be unbiased was predictive. Further, cultural differences
were found: Middle Eastern students showed higher levels of the bias blind spot than did
Western students. The findings from the current study might be useful in understanding
potential factors that attenuate the bias blind spot and suggest culture as a variable worthy
of further examination.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There often is a wide gulf between intention and action, but that it is only
reasonable and fair to apply the same standard of judgment to others as to oneself.
Following these guidelines would not just be socially charitable—it would also be
scientifically informed. (Pronin, 2008, p. 1180)
One of the challenges for human communication is inaccurate perception of
reality resulting in misunderstanding (Pronin, 2008). Even with good intentions, social
cognition (i.e., feelings, motivation, thoughts, goals and all aspects of making sense of
the social world) is affected by biases (Kunda, 1990, 1999), which are systematic and
predictable errors in thinking (Evans, 1990). Research on cognitive biases revealed more
than 40 kinds of biases that compromised judgment and decision-making (Croskerry,
Singhal, & Mamede, 2013). An emerging area of research that furthers our
understanding of cognitive and motivational biases is the work on bias perception.
According to Pronin, Lin, and Ross (2002), there is an asymmetry in evaluating the self
and others. When this evaluation occurs with regard to perceptions of bias, this is termed
the “bias blind spot.” Simply put, common biases are easy to detect in others but we are
often blind to these same biases in ourselves (Pronin et al., 2002). For example, if a
student gets a negative assessment from a teacher, the student might think the teacher is
influenced by racial bias. However, the student might have difficulty recognizing his
own biases such as a self-serving bias. For example, the student might blame the teacher

2
for a bad grade instead of lack of effort. Biased perception contributes to
misunderstanding, disagreement, and sometimes conflict escalation (Kennedy & Pronin,
2008).
The bias blind spot is the “meta-bias,” leading people to believe that others—but
not themselves—interpret reality in a distorted way (Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield,
2009), contributing to increases in intergroup and interpersonal conflict (Ross, 2013).
One suggestion for reducing the bias blind spot is to increase sensitivity to this cognitive
limitation by teaching learners in universities about cognitive and motivational biases.
Educating people alone, however, has not been particularly good at facilitating unbiased
thinking (Frantz, 2006). Consequently, researchers have considered additional strategies
including efforts to increase participants’ reflection on others (Lilienfeld et al., 2009).
Reflection on the consequences of the bias blind spot might make this cognitive tendency
more available to conscious awareness. However, research has not sufficiently
confirmed this possibility. Consequently, a purpose of this research was to investigate
the role of reflection, when paired with informational learning, in reducing the bias blind
spot tendency.
Additional research is needed on individual and cultural factors related to the bias
blind spot. Initial research suggested certain cognitive tendencies such as omission bias
might be related to the bias blind spot (Han, 2012). Accordingly, the current study
investigated how thinking styles and reasoning ability might explain variation in the bias
blind spot. Finally, there is a possibility of cultural variation in manifestations of the bias
blind spot and the effectiveness of information and reflection at reducing this bias. The
current study investigated potential cultural variations between two distinct cultures,
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Western and Middle Eastern, using United States and Saudi Arabian individuals in
expression of the bias blind spot and response to the intervention.
Statement of the Problem
Building on the work of Wilson and Brekke (1994), the mental contamination
research paradigm indicated debiasing is a difficult process because mental processes are
sometimes unconscious and uncontrollable. Dual process theory distinguishes between
autonomous processing, which is fast, effortless, and evolutionarily adaptive, and
analytical processing, which is slower, demanding of cognitive resources, and
evolutionarily modern (Evans & Frankish, 2009). Autonomous processing relies on
heuristics, which are mental shortcuts. An example of a cognitive shortcut is the
availability heuristic, which serves as a fast strategy in reasoning and judgment. It is
probable the bias blind spot results from an automatic response when people are asked to
evaluate themselves and others. Pronin et al. (2002) examined bias perception in
American students by asking them to evaluate the susceptibility of showing eight social
biases such as the fundamental attribution error.
The fundamental attribution error refers to people’s tendency to attribute mistakes
to dispositional factors when explaining the behavior of others (Jones & Nisbett, 1971).
However, they attribute situational factors to their own mistakes (Ross, 1977). For
example, an automobile dispositional explanation would be the other person does not
know how to drive; however, a situational explanation might focus on the environment
rather than the person driving, e.g., being interrupted by a phone call. The fundamental
attribution error could also be called the observer-actor discrepancy (Jones & Nesbitt,
1971). Interestingly, Pronin et al. (2002) found after participants read explanations of
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cognitive biases and were then asked to evaluate themselves versus their peers, they
acknowledged their peers were susceptible to the biases but denied it in themselves--a
result that was replicated in many studies.
The bias blind spot was successfully reduced by educating people about the
unconscious that influences their judgment (Pronin & Kluger, 2008). However, more
research is needed to investigate other strategies to mitigate the bias blind spot effect.
Reflections on the consequences of the bias blind spot have not been explored. However,
reflection has been linked to improving clinical reasoning and decreasing diagnostic
errors (Croskerry et al., 2013). Clinical cognition and the link to reflection have been
investigated within a dual process perspective where intuitive diagnostic errors are
overridden by more deliberative reflective thinking. It is probable that reflective thinking
about the potential consequences of the bias blind spot might inhibit the automatic
response (i.e., perceiving bias as more prevalent in other’s thinking but not self) and
override the automatic response with deliberative response produced by the analytical
processing. This possibility has not been empirically investigated.
It is important to investigate individual differences that might explain variation in
the bias blind spot. In the current study, three individual factors were examined: (a)
reasoning performance heuristic and biases tasks, (b) thinking dispositions, and (c)
motivations to be unbiased. Why might reasoning and open-minded thinking dispositions
matter when it comes to showing the bias blind spot? Based on dual process, accounts of
cognition, reasoning, and thinking dispositions index different levels in analytical
processing. Reasoning indexes the algorithmic level and thinking dispositions index the
reflective level.
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According to Stanovich (2009), the algorithmic mind refers to general abilities
and rules needed to solve problems. The algorithmic mind also refers to the processes
and dispositions necessary for constructing problem representations and monitoring the
efficacy of selected rules and abilities. Thus, Stanovich proposed two levels of analytical
processing. The algorithmic level is comprised of abilities, specific mindware, and
general processing resources. For example, fluid intelligence deduction, induction
abilities, and numeracy are all included in the algorithmic mind. The other level, the
reflective level, includes thinking disposition (i.e., need for cognition) and openmindedness (Stanovich, 2009). Dewey (1933) defined an open-mindedness attitude or
disposition as being free from prejudice, partisanship, and other habits that close the
mind, makes it unwilling to consider new idea, and includes an active desire to listen to
different possibilities and recognize the possibility of errors. In other words, even if a
person has an ability to solve a problem, he/she should be motivated to solve it in an
objective way and engage in analytical thinking (Stanovich, 2009). Previous research of
the bias blind spot has overlooked potential relationships of the levels of analytical
processing such as reasoning performance, open-minded thinking disposition, and
motivation. This study addressed those issues.
Need for the Study
This study used several theoretical frameworks in an integrative way to further
understand the bias blind spot. Although research on metacognition and using higher
order thinking abilities have provided useful information for teacher education, cognitive
therapies, conceptual change in students, and teaching critical thinking, it has not been
extended to understanding errors in social perception. Exploring the effectiveness of
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reflection instruction and its generalizability to individuals from different cultural
backgrounds is needed to fill a gap in the research on the bias blind spot. Pronin (2009)
commented the bias blind spot is universal. However, evidence for cultural variations in
evaluating the self in individualistic and collectivist cultures suggests the bias blind spot
might vary in different cultures. For example, individualistic cultures, such as the United
States and the United Kingdom, were compared with collectivist cultures such as China,
Japan, and India regarding the fundamental attribution error (Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller,
2004).
The Middle East, especially Arabic countries, has not been included in any study
about cognitive or social biases. However, when investigating cultural orientation being
independent or interdependent, one study (Maddux, San Martin, Sinaceur, & Kitayama,
2011) found Saudi Arabians are in the middle between Eastern and Western cultural
values. Saudis were more interdependent than individuals in individualistic cultures and
less interdependent than individuals in collectivist cultures. The rationale for selecting
Middle East and Western cultures for comparison of the bias blind spot was because
possible similarities and differences have not been investigated.
Individual differences in people such as reasoning performance, thinking
dispositions, and motivations to be unbiased have not been investigated in relation to the
bias blind spot except for one study by West, Meserve, and Stanovich (2012) who found
reasoning and open-mindedness were positively related to a perception of bias in the
cognitive domain.
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Significance of the Study
Investigating the bias blind spot and factors that might mitigate this effect has
theoretical contributions and practical implications. According to Pronin (2009), the
origin of the bias blind spot is the introspection illusion--the misrepresentations of reality.
People believe they perceive reality as it is. Pronin (2008) suggested educational
intervention highlights the limitations of introspection. If such interventions are
successful in encouraging students to acknowledge the possibility that their social
perceptions might be biased, not only might the bias blind spot be reduced but students
might also feel more confident in their abilities to construct accurate self-knowledge. A
secondary effect of such interventions might be raising students' self-efficacy and
improving their understanding of when to inhibit intuitive responses by reflective
thinking.
Considering separate research paradigms to investigate the bias blind spot was
the theoretical contribution. Resolving conflict would be achieved if students had a better
understanding of the bias blind spot and the strategies that mitigate it. Pronin (2009)
proposed that investigating the introspection illusion would help in overcoming racism,
sexism, and inequality. The same reasoning could be applied to reducing the bias blind
spot, which is a special case of the better than average effect (Arkin, Gabrenya,
Appelman, & Cochran, 1979). Perceiving the self as superior to others and showing the
bias blind spot might increase misunderstanding and intolerance, especially in conflict
situations (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Pronin et al., 2002; Pronin & Schmidt, 2013).
More research is needed on reducing misunderstanding because we live in a time where
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the world suffers from increasing intergroup conflict, terrorism, and ideological
extremism (Lilienfeld et al., 2009).
Research on motivated reasoning and decision-making indicated humans are not
always rational or fair due to the operation of motivational biases such as self-serving
bias or the over-reliance on cognitive heuristics (Arkin et al., 1979; Baron, 1990; Evans,
1998; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Klaczynski, 2001; Kunda, 1990; Stanovich,
West, & Toplak, 2011). Dual process theories of cognition and decision-making gained
popularity because they could account for both rational and biased thinking (Evans &
Frankish, 2009). Dual process perceptive theorizing and relevant research on the links
between metacognition and reducing cognitive biases have been limited to the medical
field (Croskerry, 2015; Croskerry et al., 2013; Trowbridge, Dhaliwal, & Cosby, 2013).
The implications of this research went beyond avoiding medical errors and were extended
to understanding miscommunications in relationships or school group projects,
disagreements between groups, attributions of academic performance, and
student/teacher/employee evaluations.
Rationale for the Study
The current study attempted to fill gaps in four research areas: the bias blind spot
and its relation to reflection and investigation of cultural and individual differences.
Investigating the sources of the bias blind spot is an emerging endeavor and, thus, there is
still much to learn about how to mitigate its effects. For example, Pronin and Kugler
(2007) conducted the first investigation aimed at reducing the bias blind spot by
educating individuals about unconscious processes that influence human perception.
According to Pronin (2008), relying on different information is the source of the bias
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blind spot. In the case of evaluating self in terms of being prone to cognitive biases, we
rely on introspection. However, because we do not have access to others’ introspections,
we base our evaluations on their external behavior. Pronin and Kugler (2007) found that
educating people about the unconscious forces was successful in reducing the bias blind
spot. It is possible that growing skepticism in ones’ introspection is not the only route to
reduce the bias blind spot. Recently, more attention has been paid to explore ways to
reduce the bias blind spot (Morewedge et al., 2015; Pronin & Kugler, 2007; Symborski et
al., 2014).
Still unclear is the possibility of instructing people to use reflective thinking and
introspection to visualize the impact and consequences of the bias blind spot on other
people, attenuating its effect. This reasoning is based on the value of reflection in several
domains. For example, reflection has been used as a strategy for change in practice in
clinical reasoning (Croskerry et al., 2013), cognitive therapy (Bennett-Levy & Lee,
2014), teachers’ practices (Howard, 2003), bracketing researchers’ biases (Creswell &
Miller, 2000), and students’ conceptual change in science (Demastes, Good, & Peebles,
1996; Vosniadou, 1994). Reflection has not been examined before in mitigating the bias
blind spot. A fuller understanding of the effects of reflection as an intervention is needed
because of the lack of integrating it in empirical investigations of the bias blind spot.
Reflection was proposed as a debiasing strategy that might be critical in reducing it. This
conjecture is based on the success of increasing participants’ empathy using
multiculturalism and perspective-taking instruction on reducing stereotyping, intergroup
discrimination, and in-group favoritism (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Todd,
Bodenhausen, & Galinsky, 2012; Todd & Galinsky, 2012; Wang, Tai, Ku, & Galinsky,
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2014). Thus, students who are instructed to make an effort to see the relevance of the
bias blind spot to their personal welfare (Lilienfeld et al., 2009) as well as others’ welfare
might be less likely to commit the “ not me” fallacy than students who are not instructed
to think about others and who only read about the bias blind spot. Reflection might make
this cognitive tendency more visible and available to the conscious awareness.
Cross-cultural examinations of the bias blind spot are also missing from the
literature. It is unclear if the bias blind spot is universal or it varies across cultures.
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) argued that there are cultural differences in
certain cognitive tendencies such as in the case of attributions. They found Asian people
have more holistic perceptions and Westerners have analytical preferences. Thus, Asians
attribute more behaviors to situational factors and Westerners attribute more behaviors to
dispositional factors. A relational approach of self-perception might not be the focus in
Western cultures according to Markus and Kitayama (1991). Instead, an independent
view of self is more likely. Prompting thinking about the consequences of the bias blind
spot in others might cue a relational approach of comparing self to others. The Middle
East has not been included in previous cultural investigations about attribution biases.
Only one investigation (Maddux et al., 2011) about the interdependent self versus the
dependent self showed Saudi Arabia was in the middle. In other words, Saudis showed
more dependent views of self than did Asians and more interdependent views of self than
Westerners. Comparing the effect of a relational approach in reducing the bias blind spot
is needed because of the lack of cultural investigations.
Exploring the role of individual differences such as actual performance on
cognitive and motivational biases has been overlooked in bias perception literature. Only
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one study examined the role of reasoning performance as well as self-reported bias
perception (West et al., 2012); surprisingly, the two were positively related (Maddux et
al., 2011). West et al. (2012) also found dispositions were unrelated to the bias blind
spot. They created a composite score to index cognitive ability and reflective thinking.
The composite score did not significantly relate to the bias blind spot. A composite score
was used in the current study and only one scale indexed thinking dispositions. I
extended the West et al. study by including cognitive and social biases in the bias blind
spot evaluation.
Dual process theorists distinguish between intuitive and analytical processing
systems, typically arguing errors are most likely when intuitive or autonomous processing
is predominant over deliberative thinking. It is plausible that deeper processing of new
information comes after engagement in reflective thinking. There is some support for
this contention in the reasoning and decision-making literature. People who received
instruction to think logically were more likely to avoid errors, think for longer times (i.e.,
deliberate), and inhibit intuitive answers (Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011).
An arrival to a balanced view of self might occur when students find information
about new cognitive biases and later learn they might have solved the reasoning tasks
incorrectly by relying on intuition, learned associations, or stereotypical information.
Providing information about the tendency for most people to commit these biases might
cue them to avoid rating themselves higher than their peers because such expectations
might encourage people to realize biases are common and they might be prone to the
same biases as other people.
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Thinking dispositions might have an important role given dual process theorist
Stanovich (2009) viewed it as the motivation to think in a flexible way. It is possible that
after reading about the bias blind spot, students might reject the idea and not be open to
self-criticism or negative evaluation of their thinking. It is probable that people who are
high in thinking dispositions might engage in analytical reflective thinking without the
need for external instruction. Instruction might be more beneficial to students who have
low thinking dispositions because they engage in reflective thinking in a way not
previously done.
Prior research on reducing hindsight bias supports the contention that reflection
and deeper thinking contribute to error correction. Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, and Yoon
(2007) suggested decision-making will improve if people think enough about an issue,
consider all relevant information, and spend more time and effort before making
judgments. In the current study, instruction to reflect on potential consequences of the
bias blind spot was intended to facilitate an interdependent view of self and thereby
promote balanced evaluations of the self.
Evidence that reflection is a powerful learning tool (Howard, 2003) makes it
surprising that researchers have not examined the efficacy of reflection on increasing
objectivity and reducing the bias blind spot. It is plausible that metacognitive activities
would cue students to evaluate their beliefs about their own objectivity objectively after
some deliberative thinking and considering new possibilities.
Overview of the Current Study
The present study was designed to explore how educating about the bias blind
spot and reflecting about the consequences on others might relate to it. Examining the
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effect of information and reflection on reducing the bias blind spot was done through an
experimental manipulation. There were four conditions:
1.

Information and reflection on the bias blind spot. Participants read the
definition of the bias blind spot and reflect on a question about it, i.e., reflect
on consequences of bias blind spot on others such as interpreting their
actions (individuals and groups whom they do not like or with whom they
have conflicts). Next, participants are asked to provide an example of a time
when they were less objective.

2.

Information plus reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot. Participants
read the definition of the bias blind spot and are asked to think about
consequences of participating in psychological research.

3.

No information and reflection on the bias blind spot. Participants do not
receive information about the bias blind spot; however, they reflect on the
consequences of being sometimes less objective about a situation and how
this might affect how they perceive others. Next, participants are asked to
provide an example of a time they were less objective.

4.

No information and reflection relevant to the bias blind spot (control group).
Participants do not receive information about the bias blind spot and are
asked to think about consequences of participating in psychological
research.

To test the generalizability of the reflection instruction to reduce the bias blind
spot, I conducted a cross-cultural comparison to explore the possible interaction between
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reflection and culture. The order of intervention material was also manipulated to test for
a priming effect.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The following research questions guided this study:
Q1

Are there differences in the bias blind spot among the four conditions?
a. Information and reflection on the bias blind spot.
b. Information and reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot
c. No information and reflection on the bias blind spot
d. No information and reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot
(control group)

H1

For the experimental conditions: Participants in the information condition
would display lower levels of the bias blind spot than participants in the
control group because they were not made aware of the bias blind spot
effect.

H2

Participants in the reflection only condition would display lower levels of
the bias blind spot than participants in the control group because they were
given the opportunity to elaborate on the idea of the bias blind spot.

H3

Participants in the information only or the reflection only condition would
display higher levels of the bias blind spot than participants in the
information plus reflection condition because they did not have the
opportunity of processing the new information at a deeper level.
In summary, the bias blind spot would be smallest in the combined
intervention condition and would be biggest in the control condition.

Q2

Are there differences in the bias blind spot between Western and Middle
Eastern cultures?

Q3

Is there an interaction effect of the intervention conditions and culture on
the bias blind spot?
Research questions 2 and 3 are exploratory and there is not enough prior
research to propose a hypothesis.

Q4

How much variance of the bias blind spot is explained by information,
reflection, reasoning performance, thinking dispositions, motivations to be
unbiased, and culture?
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Study Delimitation
When exploring the relationship between self-evaluation and debiasing, it was
difficult to include all relevant variables. Questions beyond the scope of this study
involved relationship to self-esteem, humility, and in-group favoritism. These constructs
remain open to future investigations.
Limitations of the Study
The limitation of the current study involved the intervention nature since it was a
short-term intervention and not a multi-dimensional intervention. The effects might not
be long lasting but this kind of design allowed one to see if the variables targeted in this
study had influence or not. Future research could utilize more extensive types of
intervention and would likely have stronger effects. Moreover, the sample was not a
representative sample of Western and Middle Eastern cultures. In addition, all measures
relied on self-report. The mode of administration also introduced a bias in the sample.
Only Middle Eastern participants who had access to the Internet and computer were able
to participate.
Definition of Terms
Bias blind spot. The “not me fallacy” is the tendency to deny the influence of
biases on oneself while acknowledging their effect on others (Pronin et al., 2002).
Culture. A particular society that has its own beliefs, ways of life, art (Culture,
2015). Western and Middle Eastern cultures were compared in the current study.
Dual process theory. An account of explaining cognitive errors distinguished
between intuitive and analytical processing.
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Heuristic. Rule of thumb comes to mind, which is formed from experience and
used in problem solving and decision-making.
Instruction. Instructing participants and prompt thinking about consequences for
others before responding to bias blind spot questions.
Motivation to be unbiased. Motivation to avoid biased thinking with
acknowledgement of biases’ negative consequences on society and one’s life.
Reasoning performance. Performance on tasks that deliberately cue intuitive
processing and over-reliance on heuristic as opposed to analytical processing.
Reflection. Elaborating on the understanding of the bias blind spot by thinking
about its influence as well as providing an example.
Reflection and information conditions. The intervention had two components
and two experimental conditions were created to test the effectiveness of information and
reflection.
1.

Information plus reflection on the bias blind spot

2.

Information plus reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot

3.

No information plus reflection on the bias blind spot

4.

No information plus reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot (control
group).

Thinking dispositions. The motivation for open-mindedness, impulsivity, and
avoiding belief defensiveness.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides theoretical and empirical support for the current study’s
research questions. First, I focus on the bias blind spot by providing the background for
construct development, consequences, measurement, and origins. Second, I review some
debiasing efforts relevant to metacognition and bias awareness. Third, I discuss how the
current research differed from prior research and on which theories it was based. Fourth,
I explore the links of three individual factors that might be related to the bias blind spot:
reasoning performance, thinking dispositions, and motivation to be unbiased.
The Bias Blind Spot: Development and Consequences
Thirteen years ago, Pronin et al. (2002) coined the term bias blind spot to refer to
people’s tendency to see biased thinking in others but fail to see biases influencing them.
Pronin et al. extended the notion of Jones and Nisbett’s (1971) differences in the
perspectives of people observing situations and acting in situations. The fundamental
attribution error (FAE) refers to the tendency to make more dispositional attributions
(e.g., a person is late because she or he is careless) for others than ourselves (e.g., I am
late because the road were busy), particularly for negative outcomes. Pronin et al.
illustrated the similarity of the bias blind spot to the fundamental attribution error in that
both involve making attributions. However, unlike the FAE, the bias blind spot is
specific to perceptions of one's own and others' biases or objectivity. For instance, when
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one person disagrees with or has a different opinion from others, that person will
construct a reason for the disagreement. In doing so, the person with whom he/she
disagrees may conclude the other has misconceptions, is biased in his or her thinking, and
the other's misperceptions may have distorted his/her interpretation of reality and
judgments. Thus, most of Pronin and her colleague’s work was concerned with the
consequences of the bias blind spot in conflict situations (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008;
Pronin, Kennedy, & Butsch, 2006; Ross, 2014).
Theories about and the implications of the bias blind spot have been discussed in
several fields. For example, in the field of law and teaching cultural sensibility for law
students, Curcio (2015) found law students perceived themselves as more objective than
their clients and less prone to endorsing stereotypical beliefs. Curcio speculated law
students perceived themselves as more objective and rational than others because they
had knowledge of and experiences with the law. This finding led Curcio to call for
instruction intended to teach students how to develop self-awareness and educate them
about the bias blind spot. Concerns about awareness of the effects of the bias blind spot
on decision-making have also been expressed in the field of intelligence. In a
collaborative study by engineers, social psychologist, cognitive psychologists, and
educators, an educational game was developed to reduce the bias blind spot in
intelligence analysts (Barton et al., 2015; Morewedge et al., 2015). This interest in
understanding and reducing the bias blind spot from several fields begs for research that
includes educational psychologists. Such research might not only add a new perspective
to theorizing in the field but might also contribute to the development of more informed
interventions than has been the case in bias blind spot research.
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The Bias Blind Spot: Measurement and Origins
A typical method to measure the bias blind spot is as follows. Participants read
about several social and motivational biases. Next, they assess their susceptibility to
these biases and the susceptibility of the average person (in their classes, universities, or
countries) to the same biases. The bias blind spot is evident when the two ratings (self
and others) are different. An alternative approach to assessing the bias blind spot, using
discrepancy scores between self and others’ ratings, has also been used (e.g., West et al.,
2012). It is important to note that out of the several biases on which people judge
themselves and others (e.g., self-serving biases, the Halo effect, the FAE), people do
admit they are susceptible to some bias, which is relatively easy to find through
introspection. For example, when evaluating self on procrastinating, fear of public
speaking, and planning, people do not show a bias blind spot (Pronin et al., 2002).
Pronin et al. (2002) concluded the bias blind spot is not just a special case of the "betterthan-average" effect (i.e., involving self enhancement motives); rather, they concluded
the bias blind spot has both motivational and cognitive influences (i.e., cognitive
availability; see Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). To illustrate, students participating in a
study in which they search for incidents of procrastinating or fear of public speaking can
search their memories and find readily available memories showing they are not immune
to these tendencies and thus do not perceive themselves and others differently. Pronin et
al. suggested the bias blind spot arises as a result of the interplay between cognitive and
motivational factors. In most heuristic and biases problems, in contrast, people are not
only motivated to see themselves in a positive light but also appear to have problem
finding evidence they are susceptible to biases. In general, therefore, it appears the bias
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blind spot operates unconsciously—like most biases measured on implicit tests. As a
consequence, people have difficultly finding instances in which they were biased
(Lilienfeld et al., 2009; Pronin, 2008).
Pronin (2008) emphasized that other cognitive illusions contribute to the bias
blind spot such as naive realism and the introspection illusion. Naive realism is defined
by Pronin et al. (2004) as “the conviction that one sees and responds to the world
objectively, or ‘as it is,’ and that others therefore will see it and respond to it differently
only to the extent that their behavior is a reflection of something other than that reality”
(p. 781). Introspection illusion refers to people’s tendency to treat their own
introspections as the only standard in evaluating why they behaved in a particular way
and whether their judgments were infected by bias. Nonetheless, people treat the
introspections of others as only possibilities that can be rejected or accepted based on
their lay theories about bias (e.g., people sometimes behave in a self-serving way). As
displayed in Figure 1, Pronin (2007) argued the different information used for self versus
other facilities the introspection illusion that impacts how people easily perceive bias in
others but rarely detect bias in their thinking or behavior. Because the bias blind spot
involves metacognitive judgments (i.e., not thinking objectively about one's own biases),
I argue there is potential for a metacognitive perspective in interventions to attenuate the
bias blind spot.
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Figure 1. The introspection illusion in perceptions of bias (Pronin, 2007).

Debiasing and Metacognition
In the following section, debiasing attempts for social and cognitive biases are
first reviewed, the connection between the bias blind spot and metacognition is then
explored, and a review of the empirical evidence for the link between reflection and
reasoning improvement is provided. Finally, differences and similarities between past
debiasing attempts and the current study are outlined.
Reducing cognitive biases and judgment errors is referred to as debiasing (Arkes,
1991). Several studies that used debiasing techniques received mixed degrees of success
(Wilson & Brekke, 1994). The current review was mainly focused on debiasing studies
that had metacognitive components. Why was metacognition utilized as a strategy to
reduce the bias blind spot in the current study? To answer this question, it is important to
first understand what metacognition means. Metacognition refers to cognition about

22
cognition (Flavell, 1979). In other words, when people try to understand their own
thought processes, they are engaged in metacognitive activities.
Indeed, metacognition has been linked to advances in thinking by several theories
and is referred to by different terms. For instance, Piaget’s (1971) concept of reflective
abstraction has been tied to the development of mathematical thinking (Dubinsky, 1991).
Kuhn (2002) explored the role of metaknowledge in the development of scientific
thinking and Moshman (2015) argued that epistemic cognition as an aspect of
metacognition is critical to adolescent development. In addition, metacognition has been
linked to improved statistical reasoning through the process of metacognitive
intercession; metacognitive intercession refers to inhibiting automatic intuitive answers,
comparing those responses to answers generated by analytical processing, and
determining the most appropriate answers (Amsel et al., 2008; Klaczynski, 2005). In the
attitude change and persuasion literature, Wegener and Petty (1997) proposed a model for
bias correction that included people’s naive theories of biases as the driving force for
attempts to correct biases. Similarly, Pronin et al. (2002) attributed the bias blind spot to
people’s naive realism—the tendency to believe that we perceive reality as it is—and
argued that several factors influence how people construct and sometimes unconsciously
distort subjective reality. Bless, Keller, and Igou (2009) proposed people need
metacognitive strategies to protect themselves from the influence of irrelevant
information that could bias judgments.
Reflection specifically has been explored in qualitative studies to determine how
it might improve people’s understanding of themselves in different situations. In the
medical field, Ogdie et al. (2012) found when medical students learned about the
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cognitive biases that affected diagnostic reasoning and then reflected on their experiences
(by writing narratives about the consequences of their biases?), 85% were able to
describe at least one strategy for avoiding cognitive biases. In the diversity education
field, Chen, Nimmo, and Fraser (2009) proposed a model, which they called A Tool to
Support Reflection, to help teachers become culturally responsive and less biased in their
interactions with diverse populations. Teachers could explore their own stereotypical
beliefs and biases and reflect on how these beliefs might influence their promotion of
diversity in their classrooms. Missing from previous studies were experimental
manipulations of reflection; the current study sought to fill this gap by testing if reflection
had the potential for reducing the bias blind spot.
Is educating people about bias enough to reduce biases? At present, the answer is
uncertain. Hansen, Gerbasi, Todorov, Kruse, and Pronin (2014) argued making people
aware they used biased strategies to make an evaluation was insufficient to reduce the
bias blind spot. Consistent with this argument, Hansen et al. found after students used a
biased strategy to evaluate a test they performing poorly on, they continued to believe
their evaluations were objective.
Bias Awareness and Education
Based on the assumption that people are unaware of their biases (Wilson,
Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002), several attempts to intervene and decrease biases have
provided different results. Several reports indicated educating people about biases has
proven insufficient to reduce biases. For example, Frantz (2006) aimed to reduce the
liking bias prevalent in conflict situations by reading about the bias blind spot.
Participants read about the liking bias, which refers to people’s tendency to accept the
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actions of an individual they like more than the actions of the individual they do not like
as much when they know about a conflict. Frantz compared two debiasing strategies:
education about the liking bias and the instruction to “be as fair as possible.” The
information failed to reduce the liking bias but participants were less biased than the
group instructed to “be fair” (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984).
The provision of bias blind spot information to participants was also investigated
as a strategy for reducing omission neglect (Han, 2012), which was defined as people’s
insensitivity to unknown or missing information. Han (2012) manipulated the
information about the bias blind spot provided to participants. Half of the participants
read only the definition of the bias blind spot and the other half read the definition of the
bias blind spot with an example of omission neglect (i.e., how people can perceive others
as more prone to the omission neglect than themselves). Han's results indicated the
information was not generally effective in reducing omission neglect bias. However,
omission bias was reduced when information about the self-others’ asymmetry in bias
perception was illustrated with examples specific to omission neglect.
Joy-Gaba (2011) aimed to change freshman beliefs about bias in the fifth study
within her dissertation. A 10-minute video discussed the bias blind spot, the prevalence
of this common bias, and people's susceptibility to the bias. For some participants, the
bias blind spot was assessed before the intervention and for others, the bias blind spot
was assessed after the intervention. Joy-Gaba found the video was ineffective in
changing the beliefs about bias.
By contrast, educating people about biases with a lecture and an activity has
effectively reduced people’s ideas about biases. In an earlier part of the same study (Joy-
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Gaba, 2012), Study 1 used the same information in the video as in Study 5 except it was a
face-to-face, hour-long lecture combined with group activity (i.e., taking the implicit
association test to demonstrate the unconscious nature of biases for participants). In
contrast to Study 5, Study 1’s intervention was effective in changing students’ beliefs
about bias but not in reducing racial prejudice.
Scopelliti et al. (2015), in their fifth study within a larger research examining the
bias blind spot, explored the relationship between the bias blind spot and sensitivity to
interventions. Scopelliti et al. focused on reducing a single cognitive bias, the
fundamental attribution error, by reading about it. Participants completed the bias blind
spot questionnaire, developed to assess 14 cognitive and social biases, and were assigned
to either an FAE information or a non-FAE information group. The dependent variable
was scores on a set of FAE tasks. Scopelliti et al. found participants educated about the
FAE reduced that particular bias but only among participants who already had low bias
blind spot scores. That is, people who were low in bias blind spot at the outset of the
study were the only groups whose FAE scores were reduced by the intervention.
More relevant to the current intervention was an investigation by Pronin and
Kugler (2007). They proposed the bias blind spot is prevalent because people overvalue
the input from their own introspections when judging themselves. By contrast, they
value behavior when making judgments about others (see Figure 2). Consequently,
Pronin and Kugler aimed to reduce the bias blind spot by educating people about the
limitations of introspection. Specifically, they presented participants with a journal
article that was claimed to appear in Science. The article included a review of actual
studies, each of which indicated people are typically unaware of their mental processes.
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The notion on which Pronin and Kugler operated was knowledge of such findings (such
as studies on subliminal primes and behavioral mimicry) would convince participants not
to blindly trust their own introspections when evaluating their objectivity. Results were
consistent with this hypothesis. Participants who read the article about the limitations of
introspection showed less of a bias blind spot than did participants who were not made
aware of the limitation of introspection.

Figure 2. A graphical illustration of the perceptual basis of the introspection illusion
(Pronin, 2009).

How Did the Current Research Differ
from Prior Research and Theories?
The intervention in the current study included several components borrowed from
previous work and theory on social, cognitive, and cultural psychology. First,
participants were asked to elaborate on the idea of the bias blind spot. The elaboration
likelihood model is a model intended to explain people’s responses to persuasive
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messages (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). According to the model, if people are engaged in
thinking about an issue (i.e., motivated) and possess the ability to process messages, then
elaboration is likely. Relevant to this study, if participants engaged with the task, they
would respond carefully and thoughtfully to the questions about the consequences of the
bias blind spot. This elaboration was reflected by the extent to which participants express
serious thinking on the "thoughts listing task."
A second component of reflection involved considering beliefs and positions
opposite to one's own (see Lord et al., 1984). Relevant to the intervention, participants
were asked to think about the possibility of being less objective than others and more
prone to the bias blind spot. Dewey (1933) emphasized people gained understanding of
possibilities if they thought about consequences. Thus, in the current study, participants
were asked to think about possible consequences of the bias blind spot.
The participants who engaged in the reflection task were also asked to consider
any event that indicated they were not as objective as they thought. The third component
of the reflection intervention was personalizing the new information. If the information
about the bias blind spot was made more relevant to peoples’ life experiences or
interpersonal relationships, then motivation to process this new information would
increase. Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog’s (1982) model of conceptual change
emphasized the role of plausibility and fruitfulness of the new information or concept in
order to undergo conceptual change. If participants could see the value of the new
information, the chance of connecting it to their lived experience might increase and,
thus, the information would be plausible. Plausibility increases the chances of
elaboration and reflection.
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Along the same line, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) emphasized the types of
cognitive processing that could explain the conditions under which attitudes change. If
thoughts about a message or topic are favorable, then it is more likely people will engage
in highly elaborated thinking. In the current study, the idea that participants could be as
or more biased than others might be perceived as unfavorable. If this occurred, it
increased the likelihood of rejecting the idea and increasing the size of the bias blind spot.
Posner et al. (1982) also argued that when people are dissatisfied with an existing concept
or idea, they are more likely to construct new concepts and revise beliefs and ideas that
made them dissatisfied. It is possible participants in this study were satisfied with the
existing concept of “I am better than average” and became less satisfied when presented
with the idea they were probably “not different” from other people.
Dole and Sinatra (1998) synthesized ideas from social psychology and cognitive
psychology in their cognitive reconstruction of knowledge model (see Figure 3). They
proposed there is a continuum for engagement that depended on the characteristics of (a)
the information and (b) the learner. First, the new information must be easy to
comprehend, coherent, plausible, and compelling in order to have high engagement with
the idea or concept. Second, the learner’s prior experience (i.e., schema) and motivation
could either facilitate or inhibit engagement. Motivation is discussed further in another
section. Dole and Sinatra argued knowledge was reconstructed when all these conditions
were met.
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Figure 3. Cognitive reconstruction of knowledge (Dole & Sinatra, 1998).

The fourth component involved framing the reflection questions in a relational
context. Because the bias blind spot is relevant to self-other perceptions, questions
framed to prime a specific cultural mindset might increase the chances participants would
view information about the bias blind spot as more relevant to self and others if such a
mindset was not primed. Consider Oyserman's (2011) definition and illustration of
priming different cultural mindsets:
Cultural mindset means a set of mental representations or cognitive schema
containing culture-congruent mental content (knowledge about the self and the
world), cognitive procedures (e.g., “find relationships and connect” or “find main
point and separate”) and goals (e.g., “fit in and be sensitive to context” or “stick
out and do your own thing”; Oyserman & Lee 2008a, 2008b; Oyserman,
Sorensen, Reber, & Chen 2009). When in an individualistic mindset, people
attend to content, procedures, and goals relevant to distinction; when they are in a
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collectivistic mindset people attend to content, procedures, and goals relevant to
connection. (p. 156)
Research on self-construal and culture suggested cultural mindsets are not fixed;
instead, they are rather malleable (Oyserman & Lee, 2007). An interdependent view of
self emphasizes relationships, harmony, and connectedness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991,
see Figure 4). This view was successfully primed in participants from individualistic
cultures (i.e., cultures that emphasis uniqueness) via reading an independent or
interdependent story (Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991) or via word search for either
the pronoun “I” or “us” (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).
While Western culture emphasizes individualism, independence, and uniqueness
and Far Eastern cultures emphasize interconnectedness, no empirical data exist on Middle
East cultures and whether the Middle East promotes interdependent or independent views
of self (note: exploring this possibility was not a part of the current study). However,
regardless of where the two cultures fall in the interdependent or independent
distinctions, I argued, based on Oyserman and Lee's (2007) point about malleable cultural
mindsets, that connectedness to others can be made salient by the type of questions
participants are asked when they think about others. In other words, framing the
reflection questions in a relational context might facilitate the perceived similarity of the
self to others (and reduce perceived differences). Such perceptions of similarity are, in
turn, likely to reduce the degree of the bias blind spot.
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Figure 4. Conceptual representations of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Culture and the Bias Blind Spot
Compared to the large database on West-East cross cultural studies (Nisbett et al.,
2001), few studies have been conducted with Middle Eastern participants. According to
Gregg (2005), conducting research in the Arab world is difficult because “governments
maintain surveillance and control over researchers, and neither Western psychology nor
recent cross-cultural psychology has much to offer by way of concept or methods" (p.
372).
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Two empirical investigations were relevant to the current study. First, the
relationship between culture and attritional biases was investigated by Al-Zahrani
and Kaplowitz (1993), who found no differences in the self-serving biases of American
and Saudi students. It could be argued that several events have happened and changed
since 1993 (i.e., 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Arabic Spring, the conflict
in Yemen and Syria, the Islamic State terrorist group, etc.). Consequently, the
relationship between culture (i.e., the West-Middle East comparison) and biases remains
unclear until sufficient research has been conducted and patterns of relationships—across
different historical periods—have been examined. Although some authors argue Arabic
individuals have high levels of self-deception (Darwish, 2006; Triandis, 2008), no
empirical evidence was provided to support those claims.
Second, Ehrlinger, Gilovich, and Ross (2005) examined self-others’ asymmetric
perception by comparing Jewish and Arab/Muslims students attending Stanford
University. Following the reasoning of Pronin et al. (2002) about the self-other
symmetry in perceiving bias, they hypothesized personal connection to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict would be viewed as a source of enlightenment for self but a source of
bias for others. This hypothesis was supported only for Arab/Muslim students; they
perceived their connection to the conflict as a source of enlightenment but as a source of
bias for a Jewish target. Nonetheless, Jewish students did not view their personal
connection to the Middle East conflict as enlightening but at the same time considered the
connection to the Middle East as biasing for the Arab/Muslim target.
Because extant research has not yielded consistent findings concerning the
relationship between culture and biases, such as the bias blind spot, it was not possible to
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propose a specific hypothesis for the present study. Instead, culture was examined as an
exploratory variable. For example, it is possible the effectiveness of the intervention
depends on the cultural background; however, there is no empirical evidence pertinent to
this possibility. Thus, the current study attempted to explore the possibility of an
interaction between the two interventions and culture.
Individual Factors Related to the Bias Blind Spot
An important step in understanding the effectiveness of bias blind spot
interventions is to investigate what makes an individual more or less likely to benefit
from the information or reflection intervention and thus show a reduced bias blind spot.
In the following section, three likely factors could be related to the bias blind spot:
reasoning performance, thinking dispositions, and motivation to be unbiased.
Reasoning Performance
People do poorly on reasoning tasks that include a conflict between fast intuitive
processing and slow deliberative processing (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Kahneman,
2011; Stanovich, 2009). For example, people fail to apply statistical reasoning when the
tasks include stereotypical information that implies different judgments. Irrelevant,
stereotypical information distracts people from the correct normative answer in base rate
reasoning problems (Kahneman et al., 1982; Klaczynski, 2013). Should reasoning on
traditional heuristics and bias reasoning problems be related to the bias blind spot? The
bias blind spot is considered meta-bias (i.e., being biased about one's biases)--the belief
that one is less prone to cognitive errors or biases compared to others.
In most of the work on the bias blind spot, researchers assumed people
inaccurately believed they were better than the average person and would be less prone to
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social and motivational biases such as self-serving bias and the hostile media effect.
When participants saw themselves immune to these biases but saw them in other people,
Pronin and colleagues (2004) inferred blindness to one’s limitations. Assessing people’s
performance on the actual tasks that could assess committing the bias was never done
(see West et al. [2012] for an exception).
Stanovich (2009) developed a taxonomy of thinking errors and classified the bias
blind spot as a form of contaminated knowledge, which includes people’s lay
psychological theories (e.g., misconceptions about how the mind works, people’s
awareness of the causes of their behaviors; see also Nisbett & & Wilson, 1977), the
accessibility of information for priming, and for reducing unconscious biases (Petty,
Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007). Pronin et al.’s (2002) research suggested the same
thing: people tend to think—inaccurately, but with a higher degree of certainty—that
others are more prone to cognitive and motivational biases than they. This inaccurate
bias perception, Pronin et al. argued (2004), arises because of (a) people’s naïve realism-inaccurately believing one's preconceptions of reality are without distortion, and (b) the
introspection illusion—over-reliance on introspection as a source of information about
self but using their behaviors to make judgments about others (i.e., in other judgments,
behavior is more valued than feelings and thoughts that, unlike behaviors, can be guessed
but not seen). In the current study, the assumption that people “inaccurately” see the self
as less prone to biases than others was examined. Participants not only read about and
rated themselves and others on the likelihood they and others would commit cognitive
errors and motivational biases typically found in several heuristics and biases problems,
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they also solved the problems by tapping the same reasoning biases on which self-other
judgments were based.
West et al.'s (2012) work was relevant to the current study because they explored
the bias blind spot in the context of cognitive errors in reasoning and decision-making.
West et al. did not assess reasoning directly, although a composite index of “cognitive
sophistication” was created by combining scores on a cognitive reflection test, SAT, need
for cognition questionnaire, and an actively open-minded thinking questionnaire (see
West et al., 2012, p. 511). West et al. proposed a possible negative correlation between
the bias blind spot and composite scores. In contrast to their expectations, the cognitive
sophistication composite score was not related to the bias blind spot. Indeed, an
examination of the zero-order correlations between the bias blind spot and several of the
measures used to create the composite revealed several significant positive correlations.
Nonetheless, the link between reasoning and the bias blind spot remains unexamined
because, as noted above, West et al. did not directly assess reasoning on bias blind spotrelevant problems.
In the current study, participants solved reasoning tasks, read the definition of
biases cued by each task, and finally rated both themselves and others on how likely they
were prone to cognitive errors. I expected a positive correlation between the bias blind
spot and reasoning (at least, in the control condition). Specifically, it was expected
participants would solve the tasks fast and rely on intuition instead of solving them
slowly with deliberation and logic. Thus, it was likely they would do poorly on the
reasoning tasks. When they read the definitions of the biases as well as the correct
responses, they would know how common cognitive errors were in human cognition.
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Reading about the frequency with which other people committed biases would thus make
it easier for people to acknowledge their own proneness to biases because they had
recently read about this bias. These participants should rate themselves as being similar
to others.
In the current study, it was unknown whether participants felt they had responded
correctly. However, prior research indicated people often solved such problems by
relying on automatic, intuitive responses and, therefore, were unlikely to be aware of
problems that could arise by relying on intuition (Stanovich, 2009).
People do not know if they are better than the average but introspection bias and
self- or self-esteem serving biases make it likely people will think they did better than
they really did. When participants do not perform poorly on the reasoning tasks, the
opposite might not be true. If student are aware they actually performed better than most
people’s average and they are, therefore, less prone to errors, they may actually display a
higher bias blind spot.
Thinking Dispositions
In the history of psychology, thinking dispositions have been referred to by
several different names: cognitive styles, critical thinking dispositions, rational thinking
dispositions, and epistemic thinking dispositions (Stanovich et al., 2011). The
dispositions are defined as “relatively malleable cognitive styles concerning the pursuit,
analysis, and interpretation of information relevant to everyday reasoning” (Klaczynski &
Robinson, 2000, p. 402).
Many thinking dispositions measure attitudes about the nature and changeability
of building as well as tendencies toward thoughtful analysis and reflective thinking. In
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the current study, information and reflection about the bias blind spot was hypothesized
to reduce the bias blind spot. It is possible that variation in the bias blind spot could be
explained by thinking dispositions.
Individual differences in actively open-minded thinking, a component of most
measures of thinking dispositions, have been widely used to predict analytical, reflective
thinking in reasoning and cognitive biases literature. Dual process theories of reasoning
and judgments emphasize when conflict arises between intuitive heuristic answers and
rule-based answers, most people rely on intuitive answers. However, those high in
thinking dispositions are more likely to override intuitive responses with thoughtful
answers. To view the bias blind spot from a dual process perspective (see Figure 5),
West et al. (2012) tested the assumption that analytical, objective answers to bias blind
spot questions would correlate negatively with actively open-minded thinking
dispositions. Thinking dispositions measured the reflective level of the analytical
processing in Stanovich’s model (see Figure 5). However, West et al. found a correlation
in the opposite direction and in contrast to dual process theory predictions. Thus,
participants high in actively open-minded thinking showed a higher degree of the bias
blind spot. They attributed the positive correlation to the function of the bias blind spot
stating, “Findings indicate a reinterpretation of the bias blind spot as an efficacious
processing strategy rather than its more common interpretation as a processing flaw.
Perhaps it results from some type of evolutionary-based egocentrism that is efficacious”
(p. 516).
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Figure 5. Individual differences in Stanovich’s model of the mind (Stanovich, 2009).

West et al. (2012) called for additional research to confirm their results and to
explore more variables involving thinking dispositions because even if the bias blind spot
was adaptive for people temporarily, it is a type of self-decision that has negative, longterm consequences (Pronin, 2009). Since West et al.’s (2012) study was the only
empirical study that examined the relation between the bias blind spot and actively openminded thinking, the current study aimed to explore the relationship between the bias
blind spot and actively open-minded thinking (including “belief defensiveness”). The
belief defensiveness scale indexes dispositions to process information analytically and
correlates negatively to reasoning biases (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000).
Motivation
Although a fair amount of research has examined the cognitive aspects of the bias
blind spot, motivations to avoid biases have not been empirically linked to the bias blind

39
spot. However, several lines of thought indicating motivations are unbiased might be
related to the degree of the bias blind spot. Some dual process theories of decisionmaking distinguish between having the ability to think analytically and the motivation to
do so (termed thinking dispositions). Stanovich (1999) emphasized the study of
individual differences in thinking dispositions in the investigation of cognitive errors.
In the current study, the motivation to think analytically was indexed by thinking
styles such as belief defensiveness and flexible thinking. The measure included items
asking about thinking styles that could be related to showing the bias blind spot. This
measure represented general motivations to think deeply, whereas motivations to be
unbiased indexed the specific motive to avoid bias for the welfare of sociality and its
relevance to one’s life and relationships. Lilienfeld et al. (2009) proposed one of the
barriers for debiasing attempts was peoples’ perception that bias is not relevant to their
lives or their society. Thus, the current study aimed to investigate the link between
motivations to avoid bias and interventions to reduce the bias blind spot.
In their model of debiasing, Wilson et al. (2002) proposed several steps to
determine peoples’ reaction to mental contamination. The first step was awareness of
unwanted influencing bias. The second step was the motivation to correct for the bias
(see Figure 6). It is possible people might want to correct for the bias if they are
motivated to avoid biases. In the same line, Plant and Devine (1998) found motivations
to correct social judgments predicted endorsement of stereotypes.
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Figure 6. The process of mental contanination and debiasing (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).
In the educational psychology literature, the role of motivation has been central to
learning theories. In the context of conceptual change, Dole and Sinatra (1998)
emphasized the role of motivation in their cognitive reconstruction of knowledge model.
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They included several reasons that motivated people to reconstruct their existing
knowledge. First, people can be motivated to engage in conceptual change when they are
too dissatisfied with their existing knowledge. In the context of the bias blind spot,
Pronin (2008) also emphasized the role of naïve theories of objectivity. The second
reason in Dole and Sinatra’s model was the presence of personal relevance. Thus, in the
current study, the motivation to be unbiased scale asked people to rate how much they
thought avoiding biases was relevant to their everyday lives. The third reason in Dole
and Sinatra’s model was social context. Thus, in the current study, the motivation to be
unbiased scale asked people to rate how much they thought avoiding biases was relevant
to their society and interpersonal relationships. The fourth reason in Dole and Sinatra’s
model was the need for cognition. In the current study, the thinking disposition scale
indexed several thinking styles that might relate to engagement in analytical thinking
including the some items from the need for cognition scale.
Summary
This chapter provided a review of related literature on four research areas. First,
development, consequences, measurement, and origins of the bias blind spot were
presented. Second, links between metacognition, bias awareness, and bias reduction
were explored. Third, current research and theories were discussed. Fourth, the role of
individual factors related to reasoning biases was explored in the context of the bias blind
spot. Reasoning performance, thinking dispositions, and motivation to be unbiased might
explain variations in the bias blind spot.

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Purpose of the Study
The primary purposes of this study were to (a) investigate the effect of
information and reflection on the bias blind spot, (b) compare cultures in terms of the bias
blind spot, (c) investigate interactions between culture and interventions on the bias blind
spot, and (d) examine the relationship between individual variables (thinking disposition,
reasoning, and motivation) and the bias blind spot. A secondary goal was to investigate
whether the order of the intervention (i.e., priming) might explain variations in the bias
blind spot.
The study utilized quasi-experimental and correlational research designs and three
variables were manipulated: information, reflection, and the order of the intervention
(i.e., priming). The populations of interest were adults from the United States and the
Middle East with the goal of investigating the bias blind spot across cultures. Approval
for the study was obtained from the University of Northern Colorado’s (UNC)
Institutional Review Board (see Appendix A).
Participants
One hundred ninety-three participants completed all surveys. For the Western
culture, 115 participants (24% males, 76% females; M age= 23.72, SD = 11.68, mode =
19) were recruited from introductory psychology classes at an American university.
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Participants self-reported their highest degree of education as follows: 70% high school,
15% associate degree, 7% bachelor’s degree, 6% master’s, 1% Ph.D., and 2% did not
report their highest degree of education. Western culture students’ self-reported
nationalities were 87% American, 1% Italian, 1% Canadian, 2% Irish, 2% Norwegian,
2% German, and 5% did not report their nationality.
For the Middle Eastern culture, there were 78 participants (20% males, 78%
females; M age = 31.48, SD = 7.80, mode = 26). Participants self-reported their highest
degree of education as follows: 15% high school, 3% associate degree, 37% bachelor’s
degree, 26% master’s, 17% Ph.D., and 2% did not report their highest degree of
education. Middle Eastern students’ self-reported nationalities were 80% Saudi Arabian,
8% Kuwaiti, 4% Egyptian, 1% Omani, 1% Iranian, 1% Sudanese, 1% Turkish, 1%
Tunisian, 1% Israeli, and 2% did not report their nationality.
Sampling
Western participants were recruited via instructors’ announcement for research
volunteers (see Appendix B for PSY 129 and PSY 230 consent forms). Due to limited
access to Middle Eastern students in American universities, participants were recruited
via online survey using the Qualtrics system (see Appendix C for online consent form). I
searched for Arabic students’ club forums in the United States, United Kingdom, and
Australia. Drop-out rate for the online survey was 63%.
Design
This was a quasi-experimental study. A balanced design was used such that two
intervention variables (information and reflection) yielded the following four conditions:
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1.

Information plus reflection on the bias blind spot. Participants were
provided with the definition of the bias blind spot, received instructions to
reflect on the consequences of the bias blind spot on interpreting the action
of others, and were asked to provide an example about a time they were
blind to their bias.

2.

Information plus reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot. Participants
were provided with the definition of the bias blind spot and were asked to
reflect on a non-bias relevant topic (i.e., the potential consequences of
participating in psychological research on interpreting the actions of others
and providing an example). Note that such reflection was added to make the
amount of cognitive work similar to the information plus reflection about
the bias blind spot condition.

3.

No information plus reflection on the bias blind spot. Participants did not
read the information about the bias blind spot but they were asked to reflect
on the consequences of being less objective such as judging their own
actions differently from their judgments of others’ actions or reflecting on
the consequences of biases in our world and how this might affect how they
perceived others.

4.

No information plus reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot (control
group). The control group did not read information about the bias blind spot
effect. However, they received instruction to reflect on a non-bias relevant
topic (i.e., the potential consequences of participating in psychological
research on interpreting the actions of others and providing an example).
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Each of these conditions was presented in either a priming or non-priming
manner, resulting in eight total conditions. Priming in the current study referred to the
priming of thinking about thinking via responding to individual difference measures (i.e.,
thinking styles, motivation to be unbiased, and reasoning tasks) before receiving the
intervention. Within each of the four conditions, approximately half the participants
received priming and the other half did not.
Participants who completed the survey in class were randomly assigned to one of
the eight conditions. Random assignment for online participants was done via club
forums, i.e., club forums were randomly assigned to receive a survey representing one of
the eight conditions. For example, the Saudi students’ club in Colorado received the
survey for the control group with no priming condition. The Arab students’ club in Texas
received the survey for the information intervention in the priming condition.
Instrumentation
The variables and associated instruments are summarized in Table 1. All the
instruments were translated by the investigator from English to Arabic and were read by
two other Arabic-speaking students who are competent in both Arabic and English to
validate the translation. I used back-translating to ensure the equivalence of the Arabic
and English versions. The final version of instruments was one reached after consulting
another Arabic-speaking student who did back-translating so the English and Arabic
versions were as close to identical as possible.
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Table 1
Variables and Operational Definitions
Variable Name

Operational Definition

Dependent Variable

The bias blind spot (BBS):
asymmetry in evaluation bias
in self and others (Pronin et al.,
2002).

A discrepancy score will be created to
be the dependent variable (i.e.,
evaluation of others minus evaluation
of self in terms of bias).

Independent Variables

Information

The two conditions were
1. Information
2. No information

Reflection

The two conditions were
1. Reflection on the BBS
2. Reflection not relevant to the BBS

Culture

Western and Middle Eastern

Reasoning performance

As measured by scores on Heuristic
and biases tasks; Kahneman et al.,
1982).

Thinking dispositions

As measured by scores on openmindedness thinking scale and belief
defensiveness (West et al., 2012)

Motivations to be unbiased

As measured by items on the
importance of avoiding bias and
motivation to avoid bias

Predictor/Moderator
Variables

The dependent variable: Bias blind spot. Adapted from the Pronin et al.’s
(2002) and West et al.’s (2012) bias blind spot scales, 15 items were developed to assess
participants' perceptions of their own biases and their perceptions of biases of other
people (see Appendix D for bias blind spot survey). Participants were asked to indicate
"own" and "other" biases for each of the five cognitive and motivational tendencies: the
fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977), the hostile media effect (Vallone, Ross, &
Lepper, 1985), the outcome bias (Baron & Hershey, 1988), the base-rate neglect, and the
conjunction error (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). An example item of evaluation bias in

47
“others” is “To what extent do you believe the average person in your country is likely to
show a hostile media effect?” Pronin et al. (2002) used less hypothetical comparison
groups (i.e., typical student at same university) as well as the average traveler in the same
airport. For the current study, it was difficult to select which comparison group was the
best because this was a cross-cultural study where equivalents in activating a certain
prototype were a challenge.
After reading a description of each cognitive/motivational tendency, participants
rated the extent to which they were prone to each bias/cognitive error and the extent to
which the average person in their countries was prone to each bias. Each rating was
made on an 8-point scale anchored at 1 = Extremely unlikely and 8 = Extremely unlikely.
To test the possibility that participants thought people in their own country were more
biased than people in other countries (i.e., rule out differences in in-group favoritism),
participants responded to the question, “To what extent do you believe the average person
in any culture is likely to show hostile media effect?”
Similar to the procedure used by West et al. (2012), which involved measuring
the actual reasoning ability and comparing it to self-reported bias perception, participants
in this study provided a “self” and “others” evaluation regarding the five cognitive biases.
They also solved a parallel task assessing reasoning performance and the ability to avoid
bias. However, reasoning performance on the hostile media effect was not assessed in
the current study.
Pronin et al. (2002) and West et al. (2012) failed to report the reliability for the
bias blind spot scale they developed. Reliability analysis for the current study suggested
a relatively low/borderline internal consistency (Cronbach α= .59) and factor analysis
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suggested the scale was characterized by one dominant factor (accounting for 37% of the
variance). Note the bias blind spot scale was not expected to have a high degree of
internal consistency. Individuals were not necessarily expected to have uniform
perceptions of their own biases relative to others. They might perceive themselves as
being less biased than others in terms of certain cognitive bias.
Predictor/moderator variables.
Reasoning performance. Ten reasoning tasks associated with four cognitive
biases were presented to participants (see Appendix E). These four biases (fundamental
attribution error, outcome bias, the base-rate neglect, and the conjunction error) are
known to activate cognitive shortcuts when making judgments as opposed to basing
judgments on careful analysis of task information, leading to systematic errors, fallacies,
and thinking biases. Performance on these tasks was used as an indicator of reasoning
performance along with participants’ evaluation of their susceptibility to common
cognitive biases.
1.

Fundamental attribution error. The tendency to attribute people's experience
of negative outcome (e.g., car accidents) to internal or personal dispositions
(e.g., personality) instead of environmental causes is known as the
fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). Two problems assessed
tendencies to attribute negative outcomes of hypothetical people’s
experience. On each problem, participants read about a situation in which a
hypothetical person had a negative experience under ambiguous causal
conditions. They indicated whether the negative experience was primarily
due to a personality characteristic of the person (e.g., not a good driver;

49
inattention) or to a feature of the social or physical environment (e.g., other
driver's not paying attention). On a 4-point scale, participants rated the
likelihood of each cause. Then the degree of fundamental attribution error
was computed by subtracting personality rating from environment ratings.
Negative scores indicated the participant attributed the event more to
environment than to personality. Positive scores indicated committing a
fundamental attribution error.
2.

Outcome bias. Four reasoning tasks were adapted from West et al. (2012)
and Klaczynski (2001) to assess susceptibility to committing outcome bias
defined as the tendency to perceive a decision as good or bad based on its
outcome. People tend to forget the quality of the decision must be judged
on what was known at the time the decision was made and not how it
worked out. Participants read about hypothetical positive and negative
outcomes for a decision regarding surgery (see Appendix E). On a 6-point
scale, participants rated the quality of the decision to go ahead with the
surgery: 1 = Extremely bad, 3 = Neither bad nor good, and 6 = Extremely
good. Each correctly answered question received one point--such that for
the positive outcome task (i.e., success of surgery), the normative responses
were the ones indicating the decision to go with the surgery, based on the
high odds (8%) of dying during the operation, were “bad, very bad, or
extremely bad decision.” Conversely, the normative responses for the
negative outcome task (dying of patient) were ones indicating the decision
to go with the surgery based on the low odds (2%) of dying during the
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operation were “good, very good, or extremely good decision” regardless of
the outcome. Then the degree of outcome bias was computed by subtracting
the rating on the positive outcome task from the rating of the negative
outcome task. Negative scores indicated the participant judged the decision
to be good based on statistical information and not on the outcome. Positive
scores indicated committing an outcome bias.
3.

Base-rate neglect. The tendency to ignore overall probabilities when
judging how likely something or a person is (e. g., in a sample of 100
people, 70 people are female) and instead focusing too much on stereotypeactivating information (e.g., competent at math) is known as base-rate
neglect. Two problems created by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and De
Neys and Franssens (2009) assessed tendencies to overlook the statistical
information (i.e., the base rate information) in the presence of stereotypical
descriptions. On each problem, participants read about a hypothetical
person who participated in a study and then they indicated whether the
person definitely or probably belonged to a certain group. For example, in
predicting “Jack’s job,” the following four alternatives were presented:
A. Jack is definitely an engineer.
B. Jack is probability an engineer.
C. Jack is probably a lawyer.
D. Jack is definitely a lawyer.
Following the practices established by Stanovich and colleagues
(e.g., Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; Stanovich &
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West, 1998; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008), a response was judged
normative (scored "1") when judgment of group membership was based
on statistical information and non-normative responses (scored "0") when
judgment of group membership was based on stereotype-activating
information.
4.

Conjunction fallacy. A conjunction error is when people fail to lower the
probability as the number of conjoined events grows. Participants were
presented with two conjunction problems: the “Linda” problem (adopted
from Kahneman et al., 1982) and the “Ahmed” problem, which was
created for the current study and modeled after the “Linda” problem.
Each reasoning problem included brief vignettes describing a person’s
appearance, personal tastes, and background information that were
designed to cue stereotypical beliefs. Two possible descriptions of the
individual were presented. One item included the conjunction of two
descriptions or behaviors and the other item depicted only one description
or behavior. On a 6-point scale, participants rated the likelihood of two
statements: one containing a conjunction of events and the other stating a
single event. In any conjunction, p (A and B: bank teller and a feminist)
could not exceed p (A: bank teller) or p (B: feminist) because p (A and B)
necessarily included all subcategories (e.g., bank tellers who are feminist
must be members of the superordinate category of “bank teller”).
Therefore, the normative response involved rating each component of the
conjunction as more probable than the conjunction.
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Reliability analysis for the current study suggested a relatively low internal
consistency (Cronbach α= .68) and factor analysis suggested the scale was characterized
by one dominant factor (accounting for 28.4% of the variance).
Thinking dispositions. This 15-item survey was adopted from two instruments
that measured critical thinking values and open-mindedness (see Appendix F). To avoid
misunderstanding of the word “belief” by participants from both cultures, the words
“opinion” and “view” were used to negate the connection between the word “belief” and
religious beliefs. The scale was named “thinking styles” for participants. Two sources
were used to create a short version of a thinking dispositions scale. Nine items measuring
traits the individuals should possess when questioned about their opinions were adapted
from the belief defensiveness scale developed by Klaczynski, Fauth, and Swanger (1998).
An item example was “I try to see the evidence from other people’s point of view.”
Another six items were adopted from Stanovich and West’s (1997) actively openminded thinking (AOT) questionnaire that consisted of several subscales assessing
openness-values, openness-ideas, and flexible and reflective thinking. An item example
was “I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles” (Stanovich
& West, 1997). Negatively worded items were reverse scored so higher scores indicated
open-mindedness. Each item on the current study was rated on a 6-point scale, 1-Strongly disagree to 6--Strongly agree. Scores on the thinking dispositions scale ranged
from 15 to 90.
Regarding reliability, Klaczynski and Robinson (2000) administered a longer
version of the scale on young and old adults and reported a high reliability (α = .80).
Administering the AOT scale on undergraduate students also yielded a high reliability
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(.83) on the original 41-item questionnaire (West et al., 2012). In the current study,
reliability analysis suggested a low internal consistency of the short version (Cronbach
α= .47) and factor analysis suggested the scale was characterized by one dominant factor
(accounting for 19.4% of the variance). Due to the low reliability and validity of the
thinking styles measure, it was excluded from subsequent analyses.
Motivation to be unbiased. Three items were created for the current study to
describe participants’ level of motivation and recognition of the biases’ impact on society
and one’s life (see Appendix G). The response format for two items--“How important do
you think avoiding biases is to the society in which you live?” and “How important do
you think avoiding biases is to your own life?”—on the 5-point Likert scale was 5--Very
important, 3-- Somewhat important, and 1--Not at all important. Those items were
reverse scored so higher scores indicated higher level of motivation. Similarly, a 5-point
Likert scale was used for the third question: “How motivated are you to avoid biases?”
(5--Very motivated, 3--Somewhat motivated, 1--Not at all motivated). The possible score
range was 3-15 based on summing the responses to the three items.
Reliability analysis suggested a moderate internal consistency (Cronbach α= .76)
and factor analysis suggested the scale was characterized by one dominant factor
(accounting for 68.5% of the variance).
Procedure
Participants either completed an instrument with the five scales in a class or
through a Qualtrics online survey. Completing the instrument took approximately 30-40
minutes in one session. In the priming condition, participants first completed the
thinking disposition scale and then they completed the reasoning tasks. Next, they read
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about five common cognitive tendencies--the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977),
the hostile media effect (Vallone et al., 1985), the outcome bias (Baron & Hershey,
1988), the base-rate neglect, and the conjunction error (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973)-and then completed the motivation to be unbiased scale. Next, the experimental
manipulation was administered (see Appendix H).
In the next part of the procedure, participants completed the bias blind spot
measure on the five types of cognitive tendencies they read about (see Appendix I). The
order of rating self versus others was counterbalanced on the bias blind spot measure.
Half of the participants were asked first about their own susceptibility to each of the five
cognitive tendencies they read about and then were asked about the susceptibility of the
average person in their country to each bias. The remainder of participants rated the
susceptibility of the average person in their country to each bias before rating themselves.
In the no-priming condition, participants first received the experimental
manipulation of the information or reflection intervention, they then completed the
thinking disposition scale, and, finally, they completed the reasoning tasks. Next, they
read about five common cognitive tendencies-- the fundamental attribution error (Ross,
1977), the hostile media effect (Vallone et al., 1985), the outcome bias (Baron &
Hershey, 1988), the base-rate neglect, and the conjunction error (Kahneman & Tversky,
1973)--and then completed the motivation to be unbiased scale.
To conclude the procedure, participants completed the demographic information
survey (see Appendix J). Note that the reflection questions were free-response questions
and content was not analyzed for the current study.

55
Data Analysis
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS version 19. Descriptive statistics
including means, standard deviations, and ranges were calculated for each of the
variables and demographic data. Next, assumptions were examined before answering
each of the research questions. An analysis of variance was conducted to test whether
there were group differences among intervention groups and the control groups. Multiple
liner regression analyses were conducted to determine how much the variables explained
significant proportions of variance in the bias blind spot.
Power Analysis
Since models that include interaction effects might be analyzed by multiple liner
regression methods (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2012), a power analysis was
performed to estimate the number of participants required for conducting a linear
multiple regression so, if present, a small effect size (0.15) could be detected with six
predictors. Using an alpha level of .05 and an f of 2.19, 98 participants were needed to
produce a power level of 0.80.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results of this study are presented in the following order. First, descriptive
statistics are presented for each of the principal variables as well as the bivariate correlations.
Second, the research questions are addressed by an analysis of variance and a regression
analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 2, means, standard deviations, and correlations for each cognitive bias
are presented. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure was used except
when noted. Bias blind spot (BBS) scores were calculated for cognitive biases by
subtracting each participant’s rating of bias in others from the rating of bias in
him/herself. The bias blind spot scores for the five cognitive biases were correlated
positively to each other at low to moderate levels. A composite score was created from
the means of the five cognitive biases to be the bias blind spot total. Following the
procedure by West et al. (2012), this total bias blind spot score was used as the dependent
variable in subsequent analyses.
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Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Each Cognitive Bias
BBS Variable

Correlation

Mean

SD

1. FAE

.80

1.59

2. HM

.78

1.52

.15*

3. OB

.93

1.67

.25**

.18*

4. BR

.67

1.59

.24**

.29**

.29**

5. CE

.50

1.11

.23**

.10

.28**

.22**

6. BBS total

3.68

4.69

.62**

.57**

.67**

.68**

1

2

3

4

5

.53**

Note. N = 193. FAE = Fundamental Attribution Error, HM = Hostile Media Effect, OB =
Outcome Bias, BR = Base-Rate Neglect, CE = Conjunction Error.
* p < .05. ** p < .0
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations for the dependent variable
(bias blind spot) and the non-categorical predictors (i.e., reasoning and motivation). Due to
the low reliability and validity of the thinking styles measure, it was excluded from
subsequent analyses. As expected, motivation was correlated positively with the bias blind
spot. In contrast to expectation, reasoning was not correlated significantly with the bias blind
spot.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable

N

M

SD

Predictors
1.Reasoning

Correlations
1
2

193

3.53

1.39

--

2.Motivation

193

12.64

2.77

.-00

--

Outcome Variable
3.The bias blind spot

193

3.68

4.65

-.10

-.15*

*p < .01

Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics for the categorical variables of condition
(information, no-information; relevant reflection, non-relevant reflection), culture
(Western, Middle Eastern), and priming (primed, not primed). The level of the bias blind
spot was slightly lower in both the information and reflection conditions and significantly
lower in the primed and Western culture conditions (see Figure 7 for bias blind spot
percentages for both cultures). To investigate if these differences were statistically
significant accounting for reasoning and motivation, I conducted an analysis of variance.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Bias Blind Spot for the Experimental Groups and Culture
Information

Reflection

Priming

Culture
Middle
Western Eastern
115
78

Number

Yes
93

No
94

Yes
100

No
87

Yes
137

No
50

BBS

3.48

3.88

3.41

4.00

3.19

5.04

2.84

4.93

(4.14)

(5.11)

(4.38)

(4.95)

(5.00)

(3.19)

(4.57)

(4. 52)

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. BBS = bias blind spot.

Figure 7. The bias blind spot score percentages for the Western (left) and Middle Eastern cultures (right).
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Assumption of Analysis of Variance
To check the assumption of analysis of covariance, histograms, plots, and
Levene’s test statistics were examined to assess the homogeneity of variances, normality,
independence of errors, and normality of error distribution. Levene’s test of equal error
variances was not significant, F(15, 171) = 1.27, p = .22, indicating the assumption of
equal error variances was met. In addition, for each independent variable, the
relationship between the dependent variable and the covariate was linear. Furthermore,
the covariates and independent variables were independent. The covariates did not
interact with the independent variable and dependent variables; thus, these assumption
were adequately met.
Results of the Analysis of Variance
A four-way analysis of variance on the bias blind spot total score was conducted
with information (present, not present), reflection (bias blind spot relevant, bias blind
spot irrelevant), priming (primed, not primed), and culture (Western, Middle Eastern) as
between-subjects variables. In contrast to expectations, no main effects were found for
the reflection, information, and the reflective x information interactions. Hence, no
significant effects were found for either intervention condition (see Table 5). Table 6
displays the confidence intervals for the two intervention conditions (two interventions,
each with two levels).
However, a main effect was found for culture, F(1, 185) = 8.56, p = .004, Cohen’s
d= 0.42, with participants from Western culture showing lower bias blind spot scores
than Middle Eastern participants (see Table 5 and Figure 8). Although not one of the
primary variables in the current study, priming was also included in the analysis.
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Surprisingly, the results indicated a significant priming effect, F(1, 185) = 8.92, p = .003,
Cohen’s d = 0.44. When the interventions were primed by presenting reasoning and
thinking styles measures first, the bias blind spot score was lower compared to when the
measures were administered after the intervention (see Table 6 and Figure 8).
In addition, priming interacted with culture, F(1, 184) = 4.60, p =.03. Even
though not a research question, regression analysis was conducted for each culture
separately to explore if priming correlated with one culture but not the other. Analysis
indicated priming was a significant predictor for Western participants (β = -.33) but not
for Middle Eastern participants (β = .06).
Although all groups displayed the bias blind spot, the bias blind spot was greater
for Middle Eastern students compared to Western students. Moreover, students who
received the individual difference measures before the intervention showed lower bias
blind spot than students who received the individual difference measures after the
intervention.
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Table 5
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Source

Type III
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

Partial
Eta
Squared

627.16a

7

89.59

3.40

.002

.114

2809.10

1

2809.10

106.63

.000

.366

Information

23.19

1

23.19

.88

.349

.005

Reflection

40.12

1

40.12

1.52

.219

.008

Culture

225.38

1

225.38

8.55

.004

.044

Priming

235.07

1

235.07

8.92

.003

.046

Information *
Reflection

19.33

1

19.33

.73

.393

.004

Information *
culture

21.09

1

21.09

.80

.372

.004

Reflection *
culture

10.64

1

10.64

.40

.526

.002

Error

4873.53

185

26.34

Total

8338.00

193

Corrected Total

5500.69

192

Corrected Model
Intercept

*Dependent Variable: The bias blind spot total
a
. R2= .114 (Adjusted R2 = .080)

64
Table 6
Estimated Marginal Means for Bias Blind Spot in the Interaction Term: Information X
Reflection
95% Confidence Interval
Information
No information

Yes information

Reflection
Not BBS reflection

Mean

6.04

Std. Error
Lower Bound Upper Bound
.73
4.59
7.48

BBS reflection

4.16

1.08

2.01

6.30

Not BBS reflection

4.43

1.06

2.34

6.53

BBS reflection

3.99

.66

2.67

5.31

The Bias Blind Spot Mean

Note. Differences in means are not statistically significant. BBS = bias blind spot

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Western

Middle Eastern Intervention 1st Intervention 2nd

culture

prime

Figure 8. Estimated marginal means for bias blind spot in the priming conditions and
cultures.

To explore the possibility that gender might have been related to bias blind spot
scores or that gender and culture might have interacted, an analysis of variance with
gender and culture as between-subjects variables was conducted on bias blind spot scores
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(see Table 7). This analysis revealed no main effects of gender, F(1, 188) = .94, p = .33,
and no interaction between gender and culture, F(1, 188) = 1.93, p = .16.
The bias blind spot is a difference score (i.e., other bias rating - self bias rating).
For the next analysis, the difference score was not used as the dependent variable.
Instead, an analysis of variance with self and other rating as repeated measures was
conducted to explore whether self bias ratings and other bias ratings differed by culture.
Results of this analysis revealed no significant interaction between culture and bias
rating, F(1, 189) = 1.98, p = .16; similarly, bias rating (i.e., self and other) did not interact
with priming, F(1, 189) = 3.30, p = .16.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Bias Perception, Culture, and Priming
Bias Perception Culture

Priming

Mean

SD

N

Self Rating

No

23.50

3.98

36

Yes

26.82

5.16

79

Total

25.78

5.04

115

23.33

3.81

15

Yes

24.77

5.32

63

Total

24.50

5.07

78

No

23.45

3.89

51

Yes

25.91

5.31

142

Total

25.26

5.08

193

No

29.02

3.42

36

Yes

28.65

3.95

79

Total

28.77

3.78

115

28.06

4.86

15

Yes

29.93

4.74

63

Total

29.57

4.79

78

No

28.74

3.87

51

Yes

29.22

4.35

142

Total

29.09

4.22

193

Western

Middle Eastern No

Total

Others Rating

Western

Middle Eastern No

Total
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In the next section, a regression analysis was conducted to see how much
variation in the bias blind spot was explained by the interventions--cultural and individual
differences.
Assumption of Regression
To check the assumption of regression analysis, histograms, plots, and collinearity
statistics were examined to assess the presence of linear relationship, multivariate
normality, lack of multicollinearity (i.e., strong correlations among two or more
variables), homoscedasticity (i.e., constant variance of error), independence of errors,
normality of error distribution, and reliability of measures (Montgomery et al., 2002).
Data cleaning is important in multiple regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012)
because non-normally distributed variables with outliers can influence significance tests.
Six multivariate outliers were identified by visual inspection of boxplots of the dependent
variable across the levels of independent variables. Regression analysis was conducted
with and without the multivariate outliers and yielded very similar results; thus, the
decision of removing the outliers was taken.
As shown in Figures 9 and 10, errors seemed to be normally distributed in the
histogram and the probability–probability plot, thus meeting the assumption of normality
of error distribution. As shown in Figure 11, the scatterplot of the bias blind spot
predicted values and the residuals seemed to be scattered without a pattern, thus meeting
the assumptions of linear relationship, multivariate normality, and constant variance of
error.
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Figure 9. Histogram for the regression standardized residuals.
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Figure 10. Normal P-P plot and regression standardized residuals.
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Figure 11. Scatterplot for the bias blind spot regression standardized residuals and
predicted values.
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Multicollinearity was assessed from several criteria and one of them was the
variance inflation factor (VIF). Multicollinearity is suggested when the VIF is larger than
10 (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Multicollinearity seemed not to be present as shown in
Table 8: all VIFs < 10. In summary, as shown in the figures, all regression assumptions
seemed to be met so regression analysis was conducted.

Table 8
Collinearity Statistics
Variables
Information

Variance Inflation Factor
1.12

Reflection

1.10

Cultures

1.04

Priming

1.03

Reasoning

1.01

Motivation

1.01

Note. N = 193.

Results of the Regression Analysis
A multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to determine if variables used
in the analysis of variance with the addition of the individual difference measures could
explain variance in the bias blind spot. The regression model was information, reflection,
priming, culture, reasoning, motivation, as well the information x reflection, information
x culture, reflection x culture.
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The regression equation was significant, R2= .14, Adjusted R2 = .09, F(9, 192) =
3.33, p < .001. In the presence of all variables, three variables were significant predictors
and no interactions were significant. Consistent with the ANOVA findings, the
intervention conditions were not significant predictors of bias blind spot (see Table 9).
However, culture, priming, and motivation were significant predictors (see Table 9). In
contrast to expectations, motivation was negatively correlated with the bias blind spot (r
= -.15). Higher levels of motivation were associated with lower levels of the bias blind
spot. In addition, even controlling for the predictive variables of culture and priming,
motivation to avoid bias was a significant predictor of the bias blind spot.
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Table 9
Parameters Estimates

Vari
ables
Information

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B
1.02

Std. E
2.71

Reflection

.12

Cultures

β

95.0% Confidence
Interval for B
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-4.32
6.37

Correlations
Zero-order Partial
-.07
.02

Part
.02

.10

t
.37

2.53

.01

.05

-4.87

5.13

-.11

.00

.00

3.74

1.24

.34

3.01**

1.29

6.19

.19

.22

.21

Prime

-2.41

.85

-.20

2.82**

-4.10

-.72

-.16

-.21

-.20

Reasoning

-.34

.26

-.08

-1.27

-.86

.18

-.10

-.08

-.08

Motivation

.26

.13

.14

2.01*

.00

.52

.16

.14

.13

Inf*Ref

1.35

1.66

.12

.81

-1.92

4.63

-.05

.06

.05

Cult*Ref

-1.27

1.87

-.18

-.68

-4.96

2.41

-.07

-.05

-.04

Cult*Inf

-1.68

1.88

-.25

-.89

-5.39

2.02

-.04

-.06

-.06

Note. N = 193.
*p < .05. **p < .001
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Summary and Answers to the Research Questions
Q1

Are there differences in the bias blind spot among the four conditions?
1.
Information + reflection on the bias blind spot
2.
Information + reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot
3.
No information + reflection on the bias blind spot
4.
No information + reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot.

In contrast to expectations, the intervention groups did not differ significantly
from the control groups. Although not a principal research question, findings suggested
priming was an important factor in reducing bias. When participants were presented
individual differences measures before the interventions, the bias blind spot was lower
than when participants completed the individual differences measures after the
interventions.
Q2

Are there differences in the bias blind spot between Western and Middle
Eastern participants?

There was no hypothesis about the direction of the relationship between the bias
blind spot and culture. However, consistent with the findings of Ehrlinger et al. (2005)
on cultural differences, I found a difference between Western and Middle Eastern
participants with the latter showing a higher bias blind spot.
Q3

Is there an interaction effect between the interventions conditions and
culture on the bias blind spot?

Culture did not interact with the interventions. There was no hypothesis about the
interaction because this was an exploratory question.
Q4

How much variance of the bias blind spot is explained by information,
reflection, reasoning performance, thinking dispositions, motivations to be
unbiased, and culture?

The thinking dispositions variable was not included in the regression analysis due
to low reliability. Since priming was significantly correlated to the bias blind spot, it was
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included in the regression analysis. The overall model was statistically significant and
explained 11% of the variance in the bias blind spot in the current sample. In this model,
culture, priming, and motivation were variables that explained a significant proportion of
variance in the bias blind spot.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This chapter provides a summary of the goals of the study and highlights the
results. Interpretations and discussions of the results and educational implications are
also included. In addition, the limitations of the study and the areas for future research
are presented. The discussion of the results is divided into three main sections: (a)
intervention effectiveness, (b) cultural differences in bias blind spot, and (c) individual
factors related to the bias blind spot.
Overview
The principal goals of the current study were to determine whether the bias blind
spot could be reduced by (a) providing information about the bias blind spot and/or (b)
having participants reflect on the consequences of blind spot biases. In addition, the
extent to which the bias blind spot characterized participants from two different cultures
(i.e., American and Middle Eastern) was explored as was the possibility that intervention
efficacy differed by culture. A final goal was to investigate the relationships of several
individual difference variables—specifically, motivations to be unbiased, performance on
several reasoning tasks, and thinking dispositions—to the bias blind spot.
The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, neither reading about the
bias blind spot nor reflection significantly reduced the bias blind spot. However, priming
did reduce the bias blind spot. When the reasoning tasks were administered prior to the
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interventions, bias blind spot scores were reduced. Of the individual difference variables,
only motivation to be unbiased was significantly related to bias blind spot scores.
Finally, cultural differences were found with Middle Eastern students, showing higher
bias blind spot scores than Western students.
Interpretation of Findings
Intervention Effectiveness
The first research question was about the effectiveness of an intervention that
comprised two parts: providing information about the bias blind spot and reflecting on
the consequences of the bias blind spot on peoples’ relationships. In contrast to
expectations, the information intervention, whether alone or when combined with the
reflection intervention, was not effective in reducing the bias blind spot. Similarly, the
reflection intervention did not significantly reduce the bias blind spot. In the next
sections, I list possibilities for why providing bias blind spot information did not
significantly reduce the bias blind spot and then why reflection instructions did not
reduce the bias blind spot. Finally, I discuss why the combination of information and
reflection did not reduce the bias blind spot.
The information intervention. I argue information in the intervention failed to
attenuate the bias blind spot possibly because (a) the content was not consistent with
participants’ prior knowledge, (b) the intervention was not focused on introspection, and
(c) the information did not explicitly inform participants how they could have avoided the
bias blind spot. These possibilities are discussed next.
The first possibility is the information might not have been compelling because it
was not consistent with participants’ prior knowledge. Prior knowledge includes schema
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about self and about others. Prior knowledge and schema about self are discussed next.
The prior knowledge about other (i.e., the reference group) is discussed further in the
culture section. According to Dole and Sinatra (1998), to facilitate the reconstruction of
knowledge, the content of the message should be convincing and compelling. In the
current study, it is likely the information about the bias blind spot was not consistent with
participants’ prior knowledge and, thus, did not seem plausible or compelling. For
example, people in general might be unwilling to even acknowledge they are sometimes
biased unless they are presented with compelling information. The results of the study
suggested participants trusted their own thinking and rejected the idea they could have
been prone to the bias blind spot. In addition and in contrast to knowledge about
themselves, participants lacked clear knowledge of other people. Because the provision
of information informed them cognitive biases are common, they might have inferred the
group to which they were comparing themselves was susceptible to biases. Participants
might then have applied that new information only to others but excluded themselves.
A second possibility is the information was not focused on over-reliance on
introspection--the source of the bias blind spot (Pronin, 2009). For example, consider the
successful intervention in the Pronin and Kugler (2007) study. They succeeded in
reducing the bias blind spot by presenting a fictional article that appeared in Science
magazine. The article was focused on introspection and included examples of the
influence of the unconscious in driving people’s judgment and actions. By contrast, the
information intervention in the present study was only about the definition of the bias
blind spot, which might have been less convincing than the intervention used by Pronin
and Kugler. In addition, the Pronin and Kugler intervention focused on unconscious
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processes and biases that arise when people rely on introspection and it might have
motivated participants to be skeptical about their introspections and rely instead on their
behaviors. If so, the reduction in the bias blind spot might have occurred, as Pronin and
Kugler argued, because participants judged both themselves and others on the same basis:
behavior. Although providing information about the bias blind spot is important, Pronin
(2009) argued it is not sufficient to attenuate the bias blind spot until participants have
read about how the bias and, specifically, until participants have read the bias blind spot
occurred because of over-reliance on introspection.
A third possibility might be the information was not explicit on how to avoid the
bias blind spot. For instance, Scopelliti et al. (2015) included information about the
strategy to avoid the fundamental attribution error. Scopelliti et al. argued, “To combat
this error, we have to acknowledge the importance of situations in determining behavior”
(p. 17). Perhaps if I had explicitly informed participants that to avoid the bias blind spot,
they needed to have rated themselves and the reference group identically. If such precise
instructions—i.e., instructions that, if participants followed them, would eliminate the
bias blind spot—failed, then the extent to which participants were capable enough and/or
motivated enough to follow more complex instructions would be called into question.
Future research needs to address this issue. By contrast, if most participants did follow
such exact instructions, then a step for further research would be to examine the
characteristics of participants who did not follow them. Finally, if all participants
followed the instructions and thereby eliminated the bias blind spot, then future
researchers could focus on more realistic instructions.
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The reflection intervention. In the current study, the reflection questions
apparently did not activate analytical thinking, at least with respect to evaluating self's
and others' biases. Specifically, the reflection group performed no better than the control
group, i.e., the self was seen as less prone to biases than other people in both conditions.
Below, several possibilities for the failure of the reflection intervention to reduce the bias
blind spot are discussed. I argue the instructions to reflect on the consequences of the
bias blind spot failed to lead to (a) elaboration on the idea of the bias blind spot and (b)
transfer of learning because the connection to the reference group was not made clear by
the reflection questions.
First, it is possible elaboration on the idea of the bias blind spot did not happen.
As discussed above, elaboration requires motivation and ability; thus, participants might
have lacked the motivation to process the information about the bias blind spot. In
addition, participants might have lacked sufficient abilities (e.g., working memory
capacity to process the information). If so, then this difficulty might have been
compounded because the bias blind spot information was difficult to comprehend (Dole
& Sinatra, 1998) or because people were self-protective and did not want to open
themselves up to possible criticisms.
Another possibility for the ineffectiveness of the intervention involves transfer
(Barnett & Ceci, 2002). The findings of Han (2012) supported this supposition. Han
designed an experiment to reduce the effect of omission neglect by educating students
about the bias blind spot. The intervention was effective when the article introducing the
idea of the bias blind spot included an extra paragraph on an example of self-other
asymmetry in omission neglect. This additional specification was absent in the current
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study--when participants were asked to engage in reflective thinking by telling a personal
story relevant to the bias blind spot, most referenced an incident with a partner.
However, when participants were asked to evaluate self and the average person in their
country on the five cognitive biases, they were prone to self-other asymmetries in
perceived susceptibility to biases. It might be the content of the reflection activity was
not specific to viewing average people in their country. Thus, participants’ experiences
during the reflecting phase did not successfully transfer to the bias evaluation because of
a disconnect with the reference group. What participants thought about the average
person or what conflicts they experienced are unknown. The disconnect in content seems
possible when cognitive biases rated in the bias blind spot questionnaire (e.g., the base
rate neglect) were not the same types of biases upon which people were reflecting.
Why was the combination of information and reflection intervention ineffective in
reducing the bias blind spot? It is important to acknowledge cognitive and motivational
biases are difficult to reduce as indicated by the debiasing research (Fischhoff, 1982;
Wilson et al., 2002). It is possible the bias blind spot is resistant to change. Also, it is
possible to view the measures of individual differences as interventions on their own.
This was termed measurements intervention by Winne and Perry (2000). For example,
the thinking disposition measure included items about flexible thinking and openmindedness. By thinking about these items, participants must engage in reflective
thinking (i.e., thinking about their own thinking). This measure could have already
primed reflective thinking and metacognition for both the experimental and control
groups. Thus, the difference was probably reduced by the measurements (Masui & De
Corte, 2005). This issue of priming is further discussed in detail.
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Priming and the Bias Blind Spot
Reduction
The findings indicated the order of intervention affected the magnitude of the bias
blind spot in both cultures. This was a surprising finding and was not one of the main
research questions in the current study. However, results should be interpreted with
caution due to the large difference in the sample for the priming and no-priming
conditions. Priming involved three components: the thinking disposition survey, the
reasoning on heuristics and cognitive biases problems, and the motivations to be unbiased
scale. Priming was investigated by several researchers interested in consumer behavior
and advertising. The findings are discussed through the lens of priming components
proposed by Higgins and King (1981): availability and accessibility. Availability means
an individual will have the related schema available with respect to the primed message.
Accessibility refers to how the priming message activates schemas, thereby making them
activated on future cognitive tasks (Hwang, Gotlieb, Nah, & McLeod, 2007). How can
this explanation be applied to the present study? I expanded the logic of Higgins and
King to understand why priming was successful in activating reflective thinking schema.
It is possible that presenting participants the reasoning tasks first facilitated the
availability in memory of incidents when they were biased or not objective. Solving the
reasoning tasks and then rating themselves on their own susceptibility to cognitive biases
might have made participants skeptical of their abilities. By contrast, when participants
simply read the descriptions of the cognitive biases and then rated their susceptibility to
these biases, they might have searched their memories for incidents that either supported
or refuted the possibility that they were as or more susceptible to various biases than
others. More specifically, evidence showed people typically are selective in searching
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their memories for evidence relevant to their beliefs; typically, people retrieve
information that supports self-enhancing beliefs. Consequently, the likelihood was small
that participants retrieved memories showing themselves as more biased than others and
high that they retrieved memories indicating they were less biased than others
(Klaczynski & Fauth, 1996; Klaczynski & Narasimham, 1998; see Kunda, 1990, for a
review). Thus, participants might have overestimated their abilities to avoid biases.
It is possible priming was successful in reducing participants’ overconfidence
about their ability to avoid cognitive biases as suggested by the finding that the order of
the intervention and the bias blind spot survey affected responses. There is also the
possibility the questions about the motivations to be unbiased might have cued
participants to avoid biased responses in measures presented later. In addition, the
information a person was less prone to committing cognitive biases was not available in
memory at the time participants evaluated themselves. However, if incidents about being
prone to cognitive bias were available in memory at the time of their self-evaluations,
then participants would likely have had some evidence pointing to their susceptibility and
perhaps led them to realize they were similar to others. The reasoning tasks provided
opportunities for participants to actually solve the tasks and perhaps judge their
performance before rating themselves on the bias blind spot question, which might have
provided a foundation for more realistic self-other comparisons. Because it is unknown
whether participants judged their performance, it is assumed most participants believed
they performed well but there was no measure of decision confidence (De Neys,
Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011) to support this possibility in the current study.
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Accessibility could explain the differences between the groups who solved the
reasoning task first compared to the group who solved the reasoning task after the
intervention. Without having accessible schemas about one’s performance and the
cognitive reasoning tasks, people could rate themselves and others without conscious,
careful thought. In contrast, accessible schemas about actual performance on reasoning
tasks might have increased the likelihood of participants rating themselves based on more
analytic processing, leading them to consider both introspective evidence and behavioral
information (Pronin & Kugler, 2007). This approach to evaluating the self could reduce
the “introspection illusion" (Pronin & Kugler, 2007, p. 565), which is the tendency to
value one's own thoughts and ignore behavior when people rate themselves. Pronin and
Kugler (2007) proposed the bias blind spot arises from the asymmetry in valuing
introspective information for themselves but not for other people. For judging others,
people tend to look only at their behavior and ignore their intentions.
Cultural Differences in the
Bias Blind Spot
The second research question was about whether there was a cultural difference in
the degree of the bias blind spot. Findings showed culture was a significant predictor of
the bias blind spot. Specifically, Middle Eastern students showed a higher level of the
bias blind spot than did Western students. The third research question was whether the
intervention effectiveness varied by culture. In the current study, analyses failed to
reveal significant interactions among culture, information, and reflection.
Several possibilities could explain cultural difference in the bias blind spot. First,
participants’ assumptions about the reference groups could have magnified or reduced the
perceived difference in bias. People’s feelings, experiences, and stereotypes about the
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reference group could explain the cultural difference in the tendency to show the bias
blind spot. However, data about how participants grouped identification were not
collected in the current study, leaving the possibility unexamined.
Western and Middle Eastern participants compared themselves to different
reference groups. Saudi students might have compared themselves to the average person
in Saudi Arabia and American students might have compared themselves to the average
person in the United States. Differences in stereotypes or schemas associated with these
reference groups could have magnified or reduced perceived self-other similarities. The
Middle East is represented in the news as an area of conflict and stress (e.g., dispute
between Israel and Palestine, ISIS, Syria, Yemen war) and the stereotype of the Muslim
Arabic as a terrorist. Middle Eastern women are typically stereotyped as oppressed by
men. It could be Middle Eastern participants overestimated the presence of bias and
irrationality in their mentality of the people in their country. In contrast to Middle
Eastern participants, Western participants might have viewed their people as fair, good,
and objective (i.e., more like themselves). Western students might have had a stronger
tendency to acknowledge similarity to the people in their country because of socialization
to a culture of perceived tolerance, equality in schools, and diversity (Chen et al., 2009).
Exposure to diversity and egalitarian values might facilitate a less judgmental and more
balanced view and evaluation of others and the self.
A second possibility that could explain the higher perceived differences is
education. First, a student might think “I am better than average in my country in the
Middle East because I read about these biases and therefore I am more enlightened.”
Second, it could be students who study abroad (e.g., in the United States, United
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Kingdom, Australia, etc.) to continue their education feel the advantage of getting an
education in relatively advanced countries. In this view, culture is actually a subculture-one that does not represent all Middle Eastern people. Geographical separation is a
possible reason for Middle Eastern students to feel dissimilar than average people in their
countries. Further, borrowing the concept of stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995),
Middle Eastern participants may have felt the need to show less group identification and
to “disassociate” from the people in their country because of the negative stereotypes
they might have been exposed to in the Western country in which they study. It is also
possible the perceptions are accurate instead of biased. Those more educated participants
might be less biased than those less educated. To my knowledge, no research on bias
reduction has been conducted to support this speculation because participants are usually
college students.
Individual Factors Related to the
Bias Blind Spot
Reasoning performance. The fourth research question was concerned with
predicting variation in the bias blind spot from individual differences in reasoning
performance. In the current study and in contrast to expectations, reasoning failed to
predict the bias blind spot. Based on Pronin et al.'s (2002) conceptualization of the bias
blind spot wherein people tend to perceive themselves as immune to bias, I hypothesized
a reasoning performance would correlate with the bias blind spot. This illusion of
objectivity inferred a gap between people’s self-reports about the degree of bias influence
on them versus the actual performance of reasoning or judgment tasks that triggered
cognitive biases. Surprisingly and as mentioned before, priming was a predictor and
reasoning itself was not a predictor. However, presenting the reasoning task before the
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intervention material (referred to as priming here) predicted variance in the bias blind
spot. There was the possibility that actually solving the problem activated a reflective
thinking schema. This actual experience was different from abstract, imagined
experiences (as in the Pronin et al.'s study) because the latter did not provide a baseline of
one's actual ability to avoid social biases. Further, whereas the reasoning task tapped
cognitive biases (West et al., 2012), the self-other comparisons that tapped the bias blind
spot were both motivational and cognitive. This difference in the type of bias might have
contributed to the failure of reasoning performance to predict the bias blind spot.
Thinking dispositions. Thinking dispositions, such as open mindedness and
belief defensiveness, were expected to correlate with the bias blind spot. It might be that
people high in need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) or open mindedness or other
thinking dispositions would have been more affected by reflection (Stanovich, 2009). So
maybe a measure of need for cognition would have predicted either the bias blind spot
directly or the efficacy of the bias blind spot intervention. Unfortunately, the measure
designed to tap into these constructs was unreliable. Thus, the question about the link
between the bias blind spot and thinking dispositions is still open.
Motivation to be unbiased. The fourth research question concerned predicting
variation in the bias blind spot from individual differences in the motivation to be
unbiased. Motivation to be unbiased was measured by three items involving the degree
to which students realized the value of avoiding bias in self-evaluations (e.g., personal
relations) and the importance of avoiding biases for the welfare of society. Although the
relationship was small, in contrast to expectations, motivation was positively correlated
with the bias blind spot. Note that a negative correlation between motivation and the bias

88
blind spot was found. However, in regression analysis including other variables, the
relationship was positive between motivation and the bias blind spot. Given that
motivation was not significantly related to these other predictors, the meaning of these
results is unclear. This finding was not consistent with models proposing bias correction
and motivation are negatively associated. Motivation was emphasized in several models
including mental contamination theories, dual-process theories of attitude change and
knowledge reconstruction, and theories of racial biases (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, &
Jarvis, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012, Dole &
Sinatra, 1998; Wilson et al., 2002). Some dual-process theories of reasoning and
decision-making also emphasized the role of motivation and, in particular, the motivation
to expend the effort required to perform well on a task (Evans & Frankish, 2009). In the
current study, it is unknown why the motivation to be unbiased was positively correlated
with the bias blind spot. Since the bias blind spot occurs unconsciously (Pronin, 2009), it
is possible explicit self-reported motivation to be unbiased was not aligned with implicit
biases. This possibility should be examined in future studies.
Educational Implications
Assessing objectivity or bias in self and others is relevant to the field of
educational psychology and learning. Most research on the bias blind spot has been
published in social psychology literature, often in research on conflict. I believe the
concept and its consequences can and should be applied to educational settings and that,
in time, educational interventions should be developed to reduce disagreement and
misunderstanding among students and other students as well as students and teachers
(i.e., disagreements that arise because of misperceptions and biased self-other
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comparisons). The perception of bias in others might affect students’ motivation to learn
and to lessen students’ enjoyment of learning. For instance, students who perceive their
instructors as biased might not only be resentful but also might make faulty attributions
of poor performance to instructors—ignoring their own weaknesses—and consequently
might not strive to improve themselves.
Fostering objectivity and critical thinking are concerns that can be seen in several
fields, although most theory and research concerns education (Morewedge et al., 2015).
More generally, the present findings contributed to a more nuanced view of the process
that drives social comparisons and knowledge about self. The bias blind spot is parallel
to the illusion of knowing (Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982; Koriat, 1998)
documented in the educational psychology literature. Whereas illusion of knowing refers
to the inaccurate assessments of one's comprehension, the bias blind spot reflects
inaccurate assessments of one's own and others' objectivity. It seems in both cases,
people over-rely on lay theories of how the mind works and ignore external evidence
showing introspection and self-knowledge are often the flawed (Dunning, Heath, & Suls,
2004). Pronin et al. (2002) extended the notion that people think they are better than
average in personality traits and abilities to the domain of cognitive shortcomings (i.e.,
believing self is less prone to bias than others).
Knowledge of how the bias blind spot develops and how it can be avoided could
probably be informative to both teachers and students. On one level, teachers could
benefit from knowing it is sometimes difficult to detect their own biases and their
cognitive biases might affect their evaluations of students. For example, consider the
halo effect (Thorndike, 1920). A teacher can be prone to the halo effect, wherein initial
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impressions can influence assessments of students as a whole. If the teacher has the
impression that student X is dishonest, then the teacher could give a biased evaluation or
lower grade based on a possibly erroneous perception (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).
Reflective thinking and metacognitive activates could be powerful tools in
improving teacher self-evaluation as well as the evaluation of students. For example,
knowledge of the asymmetry in perceptions of bias in the self and others means if we
want to evaluate ourselves, we rely more on our internal thoughts and ignore our
behavior. However, in judging students, teachers—like participants in the present
research and other studies of the bias blind spot—probably base their evaluations on
behavioral cues, the only information to which they have access. This sets up the
potential for double standards of evaluation-- judging themselves on the basis of
introspection and their students on the basis of behavior. This tendency could create
problems if teachers are not aware they are just as likely as their students to cognitive
errors and misperceptions and if they are not aware they rely on different cues (i.e.,
introspection versus behavior) in judging themselves and their students. Students also
might wrongly perceive their teachers as being biased against them because of
differences in race, gender, ethnicity, or/and religion. This, in turn, could lead to
difficulties in accepting feedback, lower motivation to learn, and misattributed successes
and failures.
Similarly, the bias blind spot has implications for supervising group assignments.
I argue that students should not only learn the content but also the skills of resolving
disagreements and learning to cooperate in the classroom. Efforts to cooperate with
others might be impeded because students might misperceive their own efforts in a
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project (relying on introspection but ignoring behavior might lead students to the belief
that they contributed more than they actually did). This problem might be compounded
by misperceptions of their peers’ efforts, which are judged on the basis of what they see
(i.e., behavior). Such perceptions might decrease trust in the rest of the group, which
could lead to more conflict, less cooperation, and/or withdrawal from the group activities.
The findings also have implications in resolving cultural misunderstanding.
However, in the case of the Middle East, my concern is if educated people have biased
perceptions of others (i.e., see themselves as superior to others in their countries, for
example), then they will come to believe others in their countries are incapable of
thinking at high levels. The consequence of such thinking might be reduced motivation
to improve the quality of education for people as a whole. Indeed, it is possible the bias
blind spot is a factor that leads more educated people to isolate themselves from the
events that dominate their countries and perhaps from the less educated people in their
countries—although this is a question for future research. Also, the cultural differences
found in this study suggest the need for customized programs and efforts to reduce bias
blind spot, and bias in general, in different cultures (Al Sadi & Basit, 2013).
Limitations
Four features of the present work limited the conclusions that could be drawn
about the relationship among the bias blind spot, culture, and individual differences.
First, the sampling of Middle Eastern participants was different from the sampling of
Western participants. Western participants completed the surveys in class and in groups.
Due to limited access to Middle Eastern students at the participating university,
participants completed the surveys individually and online. It is unknown how these
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differences could have affected the results. Second, the sample was not representative.
The Middle East consists of several countries that encompass many sub-cultures; indeed,
according to Ross (2014), one of the more important limitations of cross-cultural studies
is the tendency to ignore within-culture differences. For example, students who
participated in this study were not representative to all Middle Eastern people; the same is
true for the undergraduate students in the United States—they likely did not represent
Americans in general. A third limitation involved missing data. Approximately, 400
Middle Eastern individuals opened the link of the survey but only 187 completed it and
only one participant completed the demographic information—that participant left a
comment asking to stop wasting his or her time over philosophy. Thus, it is
recommended long surveys be avoided. Future studies could focus on few variables to
avoid the frustration of participants and the problem of missing data. Fourth, the
measurement of thinking dispositions and styles was not reliable and, therefore, was not
included in the analysis. Consequently, it remains unknown whether thinking
dispositions predicted the bias blind spot or the efficacy of interventions intended to
reduce the bias blind spot. In addition, the reliability on the reasoning and the bias blind
spot measures were borderline.
Future Studies
Directions for future studies are divided into three areas for bias blind spot
research: (a) recommendations for bias blind spot interventions, (b) recommendations for
additional bias blind spot studies of culture, and (c) recommendations for additional
studies regarding the association between the bias blind spot and individual difference
variables.

93
First, the findings suggested priming helped attenuate the bias blind spot.
However, future studies are needed to investigate which aspect of priming was effective.
Recall that priming referred to the measures completed either before or after the
intervention. Priming, however, involved three different measures: the thinking
disposition measure, the reasoning problems, and the motivations to be unbiased
measure. It is not yet clear which of these was responsible for the effects associated with
priming--it might have been one, two, or all three of the priming measures. In addition,
future studies should test the possibility that reflecting on cognition could have different
results than reflecting on the bias blind spot.
Reflective thinking was investigated by analyzing narratives in several studies
using a qualitative design (Hoffman-Kipp, 2003; Masui & De Corte, 2005; Ogdie et al.,
2012). The findings from such qualitative investigations have the potential for deeper
understanding of the bias blind spot and, therefore, should be a subject of future research.
Although analyzing the content of the reflection questions (i.e., thought-listing tasks) was
not a formal part of this research, examining the content could help identify which
participants engaged in reflective thinking about the bias blind spot, whether they thought
about experiences actually relevant to the bias blind spot, and whether individuals who
reflected on specific experiences of bias were able to generalize from their personal
experiences to different situations and problems. Future studies should also explore the
possibility that reflection and deliberation influence the thinking of people in real conflict
situations (e.g., as in the Middle East). Another recommendation for future study entails
investigating how knowledge about the bias blind spot might influence thoughts about the
self, thus possibly leading to different attributions in disagreement situations. Research is
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also needed to test the possibility that the current intervention could be more effective by,
for example, adding information about the limitations of introspection (see Pronin &
Kugler, 2007).
Second, for cross-cultural studies exploring the bias blind spot, a recommendation
for future research is to include measures of group identification as well as descriptions
of the "average person" in a specific culture. Following this recommendation could
provide a clearer picture of the reference group. In previous research, it was not clear
which reference group participants compared themselves to or what they believed about
the people in that group. Also, as a follow-up to the current study, cross-validation
studies are needed to determine whether the measures and the current findings hold up
under different context and cultures.
Third, as noted above, individual difference variables might play important roles
in the degree of the bias blind spot. Future research needs to identify factors likely to
play central roles in self-other comparisons. Examples of such individual difference
variables are self-esteem, humility, and modesty. In addition, future studies should
devise better measurements of thinking styles including need for cognition. Furthermore,
measuring the believability of the bias blind spot information or confidence of the
reasoning performance would be fruitful to better determine whether or not participants
rejected the bias blind spot idea. Also, measuring other motives besides the motivation to
be unbiased, such as the motivation to learn strategies to reduce bias, is needed in future
studies.
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Conclusion
The findings suggested the information and reflection interventions were not
sufficient to reduce the bias blind spot. Mechanisms underlying the reduction in the bias
blind spot from priming in the present study remain unknown. Priming contained three
components: the thinking disposition questionnaire, the reasoning problems, and the
questions about motivations to be unbiased. At present, it is not possible to determine
which of these components was responsible for the observed reduction or whether all
three were necessary to reduce the bias blind spot. For instance, the thinking disposition
questions required participants to think about their own thinking and, specifically, to
think about their intellectual motivations and beliefs. These metacognitive thoughts
might have increased sensitivity to, and awareness of, the bias blind spot and thus might
have had an attenuating effect. Questions about one's motivations to be unbiased might
have had a similar effect. Finally, solving the reasoning problems might have given
participants an appreciation for the difficulty of the problems and therefore prompted
them to be more objective in their self-other comparisons.
It is important to acknowledge that investigating the bias blind spot is a growing
field; there is still much work to be done to explore and identify factors that help
attenuate the bias blind spot. The present study contributed to the broader field of
cognitive and motivational biases by adding a new dimension, culture, and by showing
the instructions to reflect did not reduce the bias blind spot. In addition, as noted above,
individual differences in motivation and contextual factors such as priming were related
to the extent to which participants displayed the bias blind spot.
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As mentioned earlier, Pronin (2008) argued there is a gap between people's
intentions and their behaviors; as the current findings indicated, people appeared to be
blind to their own shortcomings but not to shortcomings in others. Although applying the
same standard to the self and others is difficult, determining the conditions under which
people are able to make reasonably objective comparisons might have important
implications for educational interventions, social policies, and understanding the nature
of between-group as well as interpersonal conflict. There is hope that when people think
about their own thinking and keep in mind their own susceptibility to unconscious biases,
they might be less judgmental of others, more tolerant to differences, and more willing to
communicate even in the presence of disagreements.
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1. PSY 120 Consent Form

CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
Project Title: Exploring the relationship among cognitive Tendencies, Reasoning, and
Culture
Researchers: Wejdan Felmban and Professor Kevin Pugh School of Psychological
Sciences
E-mail: Wejdan.Felmban@unco.edu, Kevin.Pugh@unco.edu
Phone: (970_405-6654 (Felmban)
In this study, we are interested to learn more about how adults think or reflect
on social issues and how culture might influence thinking. We believe that exploring of
the relationship between cognitive tendencies, reasoning, and culture can help educators
learn more about the learning and self-evaluation of adults from different cultures. I
would like to invite you to take part in a study to test the quality of the surveys and
inform us more about the topic. If you agree to participate, you will read about several
cognitive tendencies then complete 5 surveys and 8 reasoning tasks. Each instrument is to
be completed only one time for a total of 30-45 minutes.
For the thinking problems and surveys, you will not provide your name. You
will only be asked to provide demographic information, such as your age, gender, and
major. We will take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of your participation.
We will assign a participant number to you. Your responses will not be connected to your
name. When we report data, your name will not be used. Data collected and analyzed for
this study will be stored on a password-protected computer. Results of the study will be
presented as average responses for many students, and not as responses for any individual
students.
There will be no foreseeable risks to you or other participants beyond those
that are normally encountered while learning about social and cognitive psychology
courses. The risks are no greater than those normally encountered during regular
classroom participation. Foreseeable risks include completing a self-reflection activity,
similar to self-reflection exercises assigned to students in the classroom and the stress one
might encounter completing an exam-like instrument.
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You understand that participation in this study is only one way earn research
credits in PSY 120 class and that you may select an alternative study. Participants will
be awarded research credits for participating in the investigation for the PSY 120
class.
Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and
if you begin participation you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time. Your
decision will be respected and will not result in loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. Having read the above and having had an opportunity to ask any
questions, please complete the questionnaire if you would like to participate in this
research. By completing the questionnaire, you will give us permission for your
participation. You may keep this form for future reference. If you have any concerns
about your selection or treatment as a research participant, please contact Sherry May,
IRB Administrator, Office of Sponsored Programs, Kepner Hall, University of Northern
Colorado Greeley, CO 80639; 970-351-1910.
By clicking 'I Agree’ below, you state that you understand the purpose of this research,
what to expect, your rights, and that you want to participate in to the research study.
We appreciate your help with our study!
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2. PSY 230 Consent form

CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
Project Title: Exploring the relationship among cognitive Tendencies, Reasoning, and
Culture
Researchers: Wejdan Felmban and Professor Kevin Pugh School of Psychological
Sciences
E-mail: Wejdan.Felmban@unco.edu, Kevin.Pugh@unco.edu
Phone: (970_405-6654 (Felmban)
In this study, we are interested to learn more about how adults think or reflect
on social issues and how culture might influence thinking. We believe that exploring of
the relationship between cognitive tendencies, reasoning, and culture can help educators
learn more about the learning and self-evaluation of adults from different cultures. I
would like to invite you to take part in a study to test the quality of the surveys and
inform us more about the topic. If you agree to participate, you will read about several
cognitive tendencies then complete 5 surveys and 8 reasoning tasks. Each instrument is to
be completed only one time for a total of 30-45 minutes.
For the thinking problems and surveys, you will not provide your name. You
will only be asked to provide demographic information, such as your age, gender, and
major. We will take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of your participation.
We will assign a participant number to you. Your responses will not be connected to your
name. When we report data, your name will not be used. Data collected and analyzed for
this study will be stored on a password-protected computer. Results of the study will be
presented as average responses for many students, and not as responses for any individual
students.
There will be no foreseeable risks to you or other participants beyond those
that are normally encountered while learning about social and cognitive psychology
courses. The risks are no greater than those normally encountered during regular
classroom participation. Foreseeable risks include completing a self-reflection activity,
similar to self-reflection exercises assigned to students in the classroom and the stress one
might encounter completing an exam-like instrument.
You understand that participation in this study is only one way earn extra
credits in PSY 230 class and that you may select an alternative opportunity. Participants
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will be awarded extra credit for participating in the investigation for the PSY 230
class.
Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and
if you begin participation you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time. Your
decision will be respected and will not result in loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. Having read the above and having had an opportunity to ask any
questions, please complete the questionnaire if you would like to participate in this
research. By completing the questionnaire, you will give us permission for your
participation. You may keep this form for future reference. If you have any concerns
about your selection or treatment as a research participant, please contact Sherry May,
IRB Administrator, Office of Sponsored Programs, Kepner Hall, University of Northern
Colorado Greeley, CO 80639; 970-351-1910.
By clicking 'I Agree’ below, you state that you understand the purpose of this research,
what to expect, your rights, and that you want to participate in to the research study.
We appreciate your help with our study!
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Online Participants Consent Form

CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
Project Title: Exploring the relationship among cognitive Tendencies, Reasoning, and
Culture
Researchers: Wejdan Felmban and Professor Kevin Pugh School of Psychological
Sciences
E-mail: Wejdan.Felmban@unco.edu, Kevin.Pugh@unco.edu
Phone: (970-405-6654 (Felmban)
In this study, we are interested to learn more about how adults think or reflect
on social issues and how culture might influence thinking. We believe that exploring of
the relationship between cognitive tendencies, reasoning, and culture can help educators
learn more about the learning and self-evaluation of adults from different cultures. I
would like to invite you to take part in a study to test the quality of the surveys and
inform us more about the topic. If you agree to participate, you will read about several
cognitive tendencies then complete 5 surveys and 8 reasoning tasks. Each instrument is to
be completed only one time for a total of 30-45 minutes.
For the thinking problems and surveys, you will not provide your name. You
will only be asked to provide demographic information, such as your age, gender, and
major. We will take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of your participation.
We will assign a participant number to you. Your responses will not be connected to your
name. When we report data, your name will not be used. Data collected and analyzed for
this study will be stored on a password-protected computer. Results of the study will be
presented as average responses for many students, and not as responses for any individual
students.
There will be no foreseeable risks to you or other participants beyond those
that are normally encountered while learning about social and cognitive psychology
courses. The risks are no greater than those normally encountered during regular
classroom participation. Foreseeable risks include completing a self-reflection activity,
similar to self-reflection exercises assigned to students in the classroom and the stress one
might encounter completing an exam-like instrument.

123
If you agree to provide us with your name, email and contact information, your
name will put into a drawing for one of five gift cards to Amazon worth USD$10.00
each.
Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and
if you begin participation you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time. Your
decision will be respected and will not result in loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. Having read the above and having had an opportunity to ask any
questions, please complete the questionnaire if you would like to participate in this
research. By completing the questionnaire, you will give us permission for your
participation. You may keep this form for future reference. If you have any concerns
about your selection or treatment as a research participant, please contact Sherry May,
IRB Administrator, Office of Sponsored Programs, Kepner Hall, University of Northern
Colorado Greeley, CO 80639; 970-351-1910.
By clicking 'I Agree’ below, you state that you understand the purpose of this research,
what to expect, your rights, and that you want to participate in to the research study.
We appreciate your help with our study!
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Please revisit the descriptions of the common cognitive tendencies while you answer the following questions:

1. To what extent do you
believe that you are likely
to show the fundamental
attribution error?
2. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in your country is
likely to show the
fundamental attribution
error?

2. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in any culture is
likely to show the
fundamental attribution
error?

Extremely
unlikely

Very
unlikely

1

Likely

Very
highly
likely

Extremely
likely

5

6

7

8

4

5

6

7

8

4

5

6

7

8

Unlikely

Somewhat
unlikely

Somewhat
likely

2

3

4

1

2

3

1

2

3
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3. To what extent do you
believe that you are likely
to show hostile media
effect?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

4. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in your country is
likely to show hostile
media effect?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in any culture is
likely to show hostile
media effect?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

5. To what extent do you
believe that you are likely
to show outcome bias?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

126

127

6. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in your country is
likely to show outcome
bias?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in any culture is
likely to show outcome
bias?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

7. To what extent do you
believe that you are likely
to likely to show baserate neglect?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

8. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in your country is
likely to show base-rate
neglect?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
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2. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in any culture is
likely to show base-rate
neglect?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9. To what extent do you
believe that you are likely
to show conjunction
error?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10. To what extent do
you believe the average
person in your country is
likely to show
conjunction error?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2. To what extent do you
believe the average
person in any culture is
likely to show
conjunction error?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
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Fundamental Attribution Error Problem
1. As you were checking out of a grocery store, the clerk turned around and began chatting with another
clerk, When the clerk finally allowed toy to pay, you said, "thank you," but the clerk turned her back on
you and again began chatting with the other clerk. Why did the clerk act like she did? Rate each of the
following possibilities.
a. She was bored with her job.
Very
Somewhat
Somewhat
Very
Unlikely
Unlikely
Likely
Likely
1
2
3
4
b. She was more concerned with gossiping than with good customer relationships
Very
Somewhat
Somewhat
Very
Unlikely
Unlikely
Likely
Likely
1
2
3
4
c. The other clerk kept saying things to her and she had to reply.
Very
Somewhat
Somewhat
Very
Unlikely
Unlikely
Likely
Likely
1
2
3
4
d. She overheard you saying something about her and therefore was rude.
Very
Somewhat
Somewhat
Very
Unlikely
Unlikely
Likely
Likely
1
2
3
4
************************************************************
Outcome Bias task (positive)
2. A 55-year-old man had a heart condition. He had to stop working because of chest pain. His pain also
interfered with other things, such as travel and recreation. A successful heart bypass operation would
relieve his pain and increase his life expectancy by five years.
However, 8% of the people who have this operation die from the operation itself.
He decided to go ahead with the operation.
The operation succeeded.
Evaluate the man’s decision to go ahead with the operation
All things considered, the man’s decision to go ahead with the operation was
Extremely bad
good
1

very bad
2

neither bad nor good
3

4

good

very good
5

extremely
6

************************************************************
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Outcome Bias task (negative)
3. A 55-year-old man had a brain tumor. He had to stop working because of severe headaches. His pain
also interfered with other things, such as travel and recreation. A successful operation would relieve his
pain and increase his life expectancy by five years.
However, 2% of the people who have this operation die from the operation.
He decided to go ahead with the operation.
The operation failed and the patient died.
Evaluate the man’s decision to go ahead with the operation
All things considered, the man’s decision to go ahead with the operation was
Extremely bad
very bad neither bad nor good good
very good
1

2

3

4

5

extremely good
6

************************************************************
Base-Rate task
4. A panel of psychologists has interviewed and administered personality tests to 30 engineers and 70
lawyers, all successful in their respective fields. On the basis of this information, thumbnail descriptions of
the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been written. One of the descriptions is below. After reading the
description, please indicate what you think the person’s job. Here is the description:
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is
generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest
in political and social issues, and spends most of his free time on his
many hobbies, which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical
puzzles.
What is Jack’s job?
A. Jack is definitely an engineer.
B. Jack is probability an engineer.
C. Jack is definitely a lawyer.
D. Jack is definitely a lawyer.
************************************************************
Base-Rate task
5. In a study, 100 people were tested. The participants were:
85 Muslims
and
15 Buddhists.
Sarah is a randomly chosen participant of the study. Sarah is 19 years old. She likes to philosophize
and she hates materialism. She wears second-hand clothes and would love to go to India one day.
What is most likely true of Sarah?
A. Sarah is definitely a Buddhist.
B. Sarah is probability a Buddhist.
C. Sarah is definitely a Muslim.
D. Sarah is definitely a Muslim.
************************************************************
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Conjunction task
6. Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she
was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations.
Complete the sentences using one of the following choices
A. It is ___ that Linda is a bank teller.
Extremely improbable

1

very improbable

2

somewhat probable

moderately probable

3

4

very probable

extremely probable

5

6

A. It is ___ that Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
Extremely improbable

1

very improbable

2

somewhat probable

moderately probable very probable

3

4

5

extremely probable

6

************************************************************

Conjunction task

7. Ahmed is 31 years old, socially withdrawn, and spends a lot of time thinking about his soul. He majored
in Chemistry and is deeply concerned with issues of discrimination because he believes there is no justice
in the world. He wears traditional Arabic clothes and has a long beard.
Complete the sentences using one of the following choices
A. It is ___ that Ahmed is a fundamentalist.
Extremely improbable

1

very improbable

2

somewhat probable

moderately probable

3

4

very probable

5

extremely probable

6

B. It is ___ that Ahmed is a fundamentalist and is violent.
Extremely improbable

1

very improbable

2

somewhat probable

moderately probable

3

4

very probable

5

extremely probable

6

************************************************************
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Thinking Dispositions
Read each item carefully. Circle the number that shows how much you agree with each statement.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1.

I find good reasons to criticize
evidence that is against my view.

1

2

3

4

5

6

2.

For most of the decisions I make,
I think about how they could
affect other people.
I try to see the evidence from
other people’s point of view.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

I like to remain skeptical about
an issue until all the evidence is
in.
5. I treat evidence for and against
my opinions equally.
6. In most conflicts between
people, I can see which side is
right and which side is wrong.
7. People should take into
consideration evidence that goes
against their opinions.
8. I displaying curiosity about the
views of other people.
9. I change my opinion when I am
presented evidence that shows
my opinion is wrong
10. I defend my opinions when
someone attacks them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

11. I find good reasons to accept
evidence that favors my opinion.

1

2

3

4

5

6

12. I believing that personal
experience is more important
than impersonal statistics when
making decisions about
principles.
13. It is best to agree with others,
rather than say what you really
think, if it will keep the peace.
14. I consider myself broad-minded
and tolerant of other people's
lifestyles.
15. Some people think that men are
superior to women; others people
think that men and women are
equal. It is quite possible that
both groups are correct.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

3.
4.
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Motivation to Be Unbiased
1. How important do you think avoiding biases is to the society in which you live?
Very important
somewhat important
not at all important
1
2
3
4
5
2. How important do you think avoiding biases is to your own life?
Very important
somewhat important
not at all important
1
2
3
4
5
3. How motivated are you to avoid biases?
Very motivated
somewhat motivated
1
2
3
4

not at all motivated
5
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Intervention and Control Condition Materials
Condition (1) Information + reflection on the bias blind spot
Participants will read the following information on the bias blind spot:
People see themselves differently from how they see others. They are immersed in their
own emotions, and cognitions at the same time that their experience of others is
dominated by what can be observed externally. This basic asymmetry has broad
consequences.
Psychologists have found that people realize the operation of cognitive and motivational
biases much more in others than in themselves. This cognitive tendency has been called
“not me fallacy.” For example, when asked to estimate the chances they will get
divorced, most unmarried people say the chances for themselves are very low. But, when
asked to estimate the chances other people will get divorced, most people say the chances
for other people are very high (50% chances or higher). Another example of the bias
blind spot is when people think their own reasoning is fair and objective, but think that
other people, especially people they do not like, are biased and unfair in their reasoning
about social issue.
After that they will complete the following reflection activities:
REFLECT:
A. Think about any potential consequences of the bias blind spot on how you might
interpret the actions of people you dislike or groups that you have conflicts with.
Please list at least two consequences.
1.
2.
B. Reflect upon a time when thought you were more objective than others but later
realized you probably were not. How did this affect your relationship with the people
involved in the situation.
Condition (2) Information + reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot
Participants will read the following information on the bias blind spot:
People see themselves differently from how they see others. They are immersed in their
own emotions, and cognitions at the same time that their experience of others is
dominated by what can be observed externally. This basic asymmetry has broad
consequences.
Psychologists have found that people realize the operation of cognitive and motivational
biases much more in others than in themselves. This cognitive tendency has been called
“not me fallacy.” For example, when asked to estimate the chances they will get
divorced, most unmarried people say the chances for themselves are very low. But, when
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asked to estimate the chances other people will get divorced, most people say the chances
for other people are very high (50% chances or higher). Another example of the bias
blind spot is when people think their own reasoning is fair and objective, but think that
other people, especially people they do not like, are biased and unfair in their reasoning
about social issue.
After that they will complete the following reflection activities:
REFLECT
A. Think about any potential consequences of participating in psychological research on
how you might interpret the actions of people you dislike or groups that you have
conflicts with.
Please list at least two consequences.
1.
2.
B. Provide an example on how beneficial participating in psychological research would
be for you?
Condition (3) no information + reflection on the bias blind spot
Participants will complete the following reflection activities:
REFLECT
A. Think about any potential consequences of being less objective such as when judging
you own actions differently from you judgments of others’ actions. Or reflect on the
consequences of biases in our world and how might this effect how they perceive others.
Or think about any potential consequences of being influenced by cognitive tendencies on
how you might interpret the actions of people you dislike or groups that you have
conflicts with.
Please list at least two consequences.
1.
2.
B. Reflect upon a time when thought you were more objective than others but later
realized you probably were not. How did this affect your relationship with the people
involved in the situation.
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Condition (4) no information + reflection not relevant to the bias blind spot
(control group)
Participants will complete the following reflection activity:
REFLECT
A. Think about any potential consequences of participating in psychological research on
how you might interpret the actions of people you dislike or groups that you have
conflicts with.
Please list at least two consequences.
1.
2.
B. Provide an example on how beneficial participating in psychological research would
be for you?

APPENDIX I
DESCRIPTIONS OF COMMON
COGNITIVE TENDENCIES
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Descriptions of Common Cognitive Tendencies
Psychologists have learned a great deal about flaws, biases, and errors that are typically found in adults. We
would like you to read about several of these findings and let us know your reaction to each.
1. Fundamental Attribution Error
Psychologists have claimed that some people show a tendency to believe that a person’s mistakes occur
because of the person’s personality—instead of the situation). For example, when a student does poorly in a
test, people think that the student is not intelligent, but overlook the possibilities that the teacher was bad or
that the test was hard.
2. Hostile Media Effect
Psychologists have claimed that some people show a “hostile media” effect in the way they view television
or newspaper coverage of controversial or partisan issues. That is, they tend to perceive essentially neutral
media reports as presenting a favorable view of the other side, and a negative view of their own side. As a
result, they see the media as “hostile,” or “biased against” their side.
3. Outcome Bias
Psychologists have found that people tend to judge the quality of a decision based on how the decision
worked out. That is, people sometimes forget that the quality of the decision must be judged on what was
known at the time the decision was made, not how it worked out, because the outcome is not known at the
time of the decision. It is a mistake to judge a decision maker’s ability, after the fact, based mostly on the
outcome of that decision. When people do this, it is called outcome bias.
4. Base-Rate Neglect
Psychologists have shown that people tend to ignore overall probabilities when judging how likely
something is and instead focus too much on the specific situation. For example, when judging the
likelihood of a shark attack, people tend to focus on a news report of a single attack, rather than on the fact
that although several millions of people swim in ocean water, only a few people are killed by sharks every
year. When people focus on the specific example and ignore the overall probability, this is termed base-rate
neglect.
5. Conjunction Error
Psychologists have found that people tend to believe that things go together when in fact they do not
necessarily go together. There is an error in estimating a higher probability that these two things occur
together, or are conjoined, than the probability of each thing occurring separately. For example, this error,
called the conjunction error, would be made when people think that the chances of someone being my
brother and being a teacher is higher than the chances that someone is either my brother or a teacher. In
reality, the probability of someone being my brother and a teacher is lower than either someone being my
brother or a teacher.

APPENDIX J
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Demographic Information
Age _________
Gender _________
Nationality _________
Ethnicity _________
Native language _________
Highest degree:
High school
Associates (two year college degree)
B. S. or B. A.
M. S. or M. A.
Ph.D or equivalent
If applicable: Are you in:
PSY 120
PSY 230
Year in school _________
GPA (if you are a graduate student, please report your undergraduate GPA)

Thank you! We appreciate your help with our study!

